Inordinate and unexplained delay, despite successive remedies, warrants refusal of condonation.

The appellants challenged the trial court’s order dated 24 November 2014, by which their plaint seeking a declaration of rescission of an agreement to sell was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for non-payment of the requisite court fee.

The trial court had granted repeated opportunities to deposit the deficient court fee, but the appellants failed to do so.

Approximately eight months after the rejection of the plaint, the appellants filed a review application, which was dismissed on 11 April 2017.

They thereafter filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, which was withdrawn on 1 November 2022 with liberty to file an appeal under Section 96 CPC.

The present first appeal was filed only on 6 January 2026, involving a delay of 3,963 days, or approximately eleven years.

The appellants sought condonation of delay on the grounds that they had been pursuing alternative remedies and lacked sufficient funds to undertake legal proceedings.

1. Whether the appellants had shown “sufficient cause” for condoning the delay of 3,963 days in filing the first appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

2. Whether the pendency of the review application, the subsequent Article 227 petition, and the alleged lack of funds justified condonation of the prolonged and unexplained delay.

3. Whether the first appeal could be entertained despite the appellants’ failure to pursue the statutory appellate remedy diligently after rejection of the plaint.

The Court applied the limitation principles under Sections 3 and 5 of the Limitation Act: limitation is founded on public policy, Section 3 must be applied strictly, and delay under Section 5 may be condoned only where sufficient cause is established, subject to judicial discretion and considerations of negligence, inordinate delay, and want of due diligence.

The Court further relied on Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92, which holds that a litigant seeking condonation must provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that financial inability to pay court fees ordinarily does not constitute sufficient cause, particularly where a defective appeal or other statutory remedies are available.

The Court also noted Section 149 CPC, which permits the court to allow payment of deficient court fees at any stage, and the availability of proceedings to sue as an indigent person.

The impugned plaint had been rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for non-payment of court fees, and the proposed appellate remedy lay under Section 96 CPC.

The Court found a sustained pattern of delay and disinclination to pursue the matter.

The appellants did not immediately challenge the 2014 order; they filed the review only after approximately eight months, allowed it to remain pending for nearly one year and nine months, and filed the Article 227 petition after a further period of about six months.

Most significantly, after withdrawing the Article 227 petition on 1 November 2022, they waited nearly three years and two months before filing the appeal on 6 January 2026, without providing any cogent explanation for this period.

The Court held that merely pursuing other remedies did not explain the intervening periods of silence.

The plea of financial hardship was also rejected because the court fee paid in the appeal was only Rs. 2,600; moreover, the appellants could have filed a defective appeal subject to payment of the deficit court fee under Section 149 CPC or sought permission to sue as indigent persons.

Applying the principles that inordinate delay, negligence, and lack of due diligence may justify refusal of condonation even where some explanation is offered, the Court held that the appellants had failed to establish sufficient cause.

I.A. No. 3866 of 2026 seeking condonation of delay was rejected.

Consequently, the first appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation.