Inordinate appellate delay cannot be condoned where the litigant shows negligence and no sufficient cause.

The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their suit by a judgment and decree dated 15 March 2017.

They filed an appeal in 2024, and the Appellate Court refused to condone the delay.

The petitioners attributed the delay to COVID-19, the death of petitioner No. 2’s son in April 2021, and difficulty reaching agreement among co-owners about pursuing an appeal.

They challenged the refusal to condone delay under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The petitioners’ counsel did not provide the delay-condonation application when asked by the Court.

1. Whether the Appellate Court erred in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal against the 2017 decree

2. Whether the High Court should interfere under Article 227 with the Appellate Court’s refusal to condone the delay

Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, delay may be condoned where sufficient cause is established; the discretion must be exercised judicially, taking account of the explanation, the length of delay, negligence, inaction, and bona fides.

A liberal approach does not justify condoning inordinate delay where the litigant has not acted diligently.

The Court relied on Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash (2024), K.B. Lal v. Gyanendra Pratap (2024), Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) (2024), Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013), and Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board (2025) for these principles.

The Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 was also invoked in the petition.

The Court found that the petitioners had allowed more than seven years to pass between the trial decree and the appeal, without establishing sufficient cause for the delay.

The disagreement among co-plaintiffs did not explain why petitioner No. 1, an advocate, could not file an appeal and join the others as respondents.

The son’s death occurred about four years after the decree and was followed by a further delay of nearly three years before the appeal was filed; COVID-19 also arose after the decree.

The petitioners’ failure to provide the delay application prevented the Court from examining its averments, and the Court confined its review to the impugned order.

On these facts, it found negligence and no sufficient cause, and discerned no legal error warranting interference.

It dismissed the petition, discharged the notice, and made no order as to costs.