Inordinate delay cannot be condoned where the litigant’s own inaction defeats sufficient cause.

The adjudicating authority passed an order-in-original on 22 December 2021.

Nancy Trading Company appealed to the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) on 16 February 2024, stating that it had received the order on 15 December 2023.

The appeal was delayed by 694 days.

The appellant attributed the delay to its proprietor’s wife undergoing cancer treatment and to counsel’s failure to communicate the order.

After seeking proof of service and permitting successive applications and an affidavit, CESTAT dismissed the condonation application.

It found the explanation inadequate, including because the appellant had continued its business, had not enquired about the proceedings for nearly two years, and had become active only after recovery measures were initiated.

The appellant challenged that dismissal under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

1. Whether the appellant had shown sufficient cause to condone the 694-day delay in filing its appeal before CESTAT.

2. Whether CESTAT’s refusal to condone the delay involved a factual or legal error giving rise to a substantial question of law under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 provides the route for an appeal to the High Court on a substantial question of law.

The Court applied the principle that “sufficient cause” is required for condonation of delay: a liberal approach may be appropriate for short delays, but an inordinate delay warrants a stricter assessment (Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn., (2010) 5 SCC 459).

A litigant cannot ordinarily shift the entire blame for prolonged inaction onto counsel, since the litigant must remain vigilant about proceedings (Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380; Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185).

Condonation is discretionary and cannot be granted mechanically or on equitable grounds where sufficient cause is absent, particularly where negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides is evident (Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA), (2024) 12 SCC 336).

The Court found that the appellant’s explanation did not account for the full period of delay.

Counsel’s affidavit stated that attempts had been made to contact the appellant by phone, but did not establish that calls went unanswered or that the order had been sent by message or post.

The appellant also made no effort for nearly two years to enquire about the proceedings, despite continuing its trading business.

The Court held that the appellant could not place the entire responsibility on counsel and that its prompt response only after coercive recovery measures began did not establish sufficient cause.

CESTAT’s assessment of the explanation was therefore neither factually nor legally erroneous.

The appeal was dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.