Inordinate, unexplained delay cannot be condoned on equitable grounds without establishing "sufficient cause" under Section 5.

The petitioner (PGVCL) filed a suit in 2001 for recovery of electricity dues.

Though the respondent appeared via an advocate, he failed to file a written statement, and the suit was decreed in favor of PGVCL on 29.02.2008.

In 2019, PGVCL initiated execution proceedings, leading to the issuance of a recovery warrant.

The respondent then filed an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, accompanied by an application to condone a delay of 14 years and 09 months.

The respondent claimed he was under the impression that his acquittal in a concurrent criminal case (decided on 31.12.2010) would result in the dismissal of the civil suit.

The Principal District Judge, Porbandar, condoned the delay on 07.08.2023, subject to costs.

The petitioner challenged this order before the High Court.

1. Whether the respondent established "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone an inordinate delay of 14 years and 09 months.

2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court exercised its discretionary power judiciously in condoning delay based on facts that were ex-facie incorrect.

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, emphasizing that while "sufficient cause" should be interpreted liberally to advance justice, it cannot be used to override the rigors of the law when negligence or lack of bona fides is evident.

It relied on P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, holding that equity cannot be a basis for extending limitation.

It further cited Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, establishing that inordinate delay warrants a strict approach and that concocted explanations must be rejected.

The doctrine of dura lex sed lex (the law is hard, but it is the law) was invoked to state that statutes of limitation are based on public policy to end stale litigations.

The Court observed that the respondent’s primary justification—waiting for the criminal case outcome—was factually fraudulent. The civil suit was decreed in 2008, nearly two years before the criminal acquittal in 2010; thus, the claim that the respondent remained inactive awaiting the criminal judgment was logically impossible.

The Court noted that the respondent failed to provide any other reasons to explain the "colossal" delay of nearly 15 years.

It criticized the Principal District Judge for recording a "strange finding" that PGVCL failed to produce evidence to challenge the delay, noting that the burden of proof lies entirely on the applicant seeking condonation.

The High Court reasoned that condoning such a massive delay without a bona fide explanation violates the principles of judicial discretion and creates a sense of insecurity for decree-holders.

The Court allowed the petition, quashed the order dated 07.08.2023 passed in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 60 of 2022, and dismissed the respondent's application for condonation of delay. The Court ordered that any costs deposited or paid by the respondent pursuant to the impugned order be refunded.