Inquiry Officer cannot exceed charge sheet scope, absence is misconduct only if willful.

The applicant, Vijay Sharma, appointed in Railway service on 25.09.1993, was promoted to Senior Assistant Loco Pilot (Electric).

He was granted leave from 28.10.2005 to 29.10.2005.

On 30.10.2005, he fell sick and informed the authority, submitting sick reports, leave applications, and Private Medical Certificates (PMCs).

He remained under treatment from 30.10.2005 to 28.04.2006 and on Railway sick leave from 10.05.2006 to 06.06.2006.

He could not attend duty from 08.06.2006 to 11.06.2006 due to NTB, then attended a safety camp from 19.06.2006 to 20.06.2006.

He again submitted a PMC and leave application for 21.06.2006 to 21.06.2007.

All leave applications and medical certificates were accepted, and his illness was verified by the Senior Crew Controller.

Despite this, he was served a major penalty charge sheet dated 13.10.2006, alleging unauthorized absence from 31.10.2005 to 28.04.2006, 08.04.2006 to 11.06.2006, and continuously from 21.06.2006 onwards.

An Inquiry Officer was appointed, who, in his report dated 21.01.2008, found only the absence from 08.06.2006 to 11.06.2006 proved.

However, the Inquiry Officer also observed that the applicant remained continuously absent from 22.06.2007.

The Disciplinary Authority accepted the report and imposed a major penalty, which was upheld on appeal and revision.

The applicant then filed O.A. No. 1422/2009, which the Tribunal allowed on 27.11.2009, directing a fresh order.

A fresh order dated 13.02.2010 was passed by an authority that the applicant contended was the Appellate Authority, not competent to act as the Disciplinary Authority.

He appealed this order, but it remained undecided.

The applicant argued that the Inquiry Officer exceeded jurisdiction by finding absence from 22.06.2007, a period beyond the charge sheet dated 29.11.2006.

Respondents contended that IRMM Para 538(4) required specific procedures for sick leave.

Respondents also argued that the Disciplinary Authority was competent, even if previously the Appellate Authority, and that findings regarding continuous absence from the date of the charge memo were valid.

1. Whether the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated because the punishment order was passed by an officer who functioned as the Appellate Authority, not the Disciplinary Authority, in the applicant's case.

2. Whether the Inquiry Officer exceeded his jurisdiction by recording findings regarding alleged absence from 22.06.2007, a period beyond the scope of the charge sheet dated 29.11.2006.

3. Whether the unauthorized absence amounted to misconduct in the absence of a specific finding by the Inquiry Officer that the absence was willful.

The court relied on the principle that the mere change in designation or upgradation of a post does not invalidate an order passed by an officer acting as the Disciplinary Authority, even if they previously functioned as an Appellate Authority, as long as a higher authority exists for appeal.

The court also applied a precedent from Krushnakant B Parmar Vs Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 2106 of 2012), which established that unauthorized absence from duty amounts to misconduct only if it is proven to be willful, and in its absence, it will not amount to misconduct.

It further noted that an inquiry cannot travel beyond the specific charges framed against the delinquent employee.

The court first addressed the competency of the Disciplinary Authority, holding that an order passed by an officer acting as Disciplinary Authority is not automatically invalid merely because that officer had, at an earlier time, functioned as the Appellate Authority.

It reasoned that a change in designation or upgradation simply alters the appellate forum to a superior authority.

Since the applicant had, in fact, preferred an appeal to a higher competent authority, this ground for vitiating the proceedings was rejected.

However, the court found merit in the applicant's contention that the Inquiry Officer exceeded his jurisdiction.

The charge sheet was served on 29.11.2006.

The Inquiry Officer, despite finding no evidence for unauthorized absence from 21.06.2006 to 21.06.2007, observed that the applicant remained continuously absent from 22.06.2007 onwards.

The court determined that any allegation of continuous absence could only legally extend up to the date of service of the charge memo.

Therefore, findings concerning alleged absence from 22.06.2007 were beyond the charge sheet's scope, rendering those findings unsustainable and demonstrating that the Inquiry Officer traveled beyond his jurisdiction.

Crucially, the court analyzed the absence of a finding on willfulness, referencing the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in *Krushnakant B. Parmar*.

This precedent states that unauthorized absence constitutes misconduct only when it is willful.

The charge memo itself did not specifically state that the absence was willful.

The applicant asserted that he had submitted medical certificates and leave applications for the period in question.

The Inquiry Officer failed to examine this aspect or record a definite finding on the element of willfulness, which is mandatory.

The absence of such a clear finding, especially when willfulness was not explicitly disclosed in the charge memo, vitiated the inquiry proceedings.

The Original Application was allowed, and the inquiry report and the order dated 13.02.2010 passed by the Disciplinary Authority were quashed and set aside.

The applicant's position is to be restored as if no disciplinary order was ever passed.

The respondents were granted liberty to initiate *de novo* proceedings from the stage of issuing a fresh charge sheet in accordance with law.

If no such proceedings are initiated, the respondents are directed to pass a specific and reasoned order regarding the treatment of the period of absence mentioned in the original charge memo, in accordance with rules, within three months from the receipt of the order.