Interested Witness Testimony Sufficient for Conviction if Credible; Constructive Liability Requires Proof of Shared Common Object

On June 24, 2015, Umesh Pandey, a peon at Aganur High School, was assaulted and shot dead near the school gate.

The motive was allegedly the deceased’s objection to the activities of miscreants (specifically associates of Pankaj Kumar) who harassed girl students.

Prosecution witnesses 5 and 6 (sons of the deceased) claimed that the accused, including appellants Fiddu Yadav, Rajesh Yadav, Rambrat Yadav, and Jalendra Yadav, dragged the deceased outside the school, assaulted him with fists and kicks, and then Fiddu, Rajesh, and Pappu (absconding) fired shots at his head and chest.

The injured died on the way to the hospital.

The Trial Court convicted all four appellants under Sections 302/149 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

The appellants challenged this on grounds of interested witnesses, lack of independent corroboration, and failure to prove "common object" for murder for all members.

1. Whether the prosecution established the guilt of all appellants for murder with the aid of Section 149 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Whether the testimony of interested witnesses (the sons of the deceased) is reliable without independent corroboration.

3. Whether the alleged oral dying declaration of the deceased could form the basis of conviction.

The Court applied Section 141 of the IPC defining "unlawful assembly" and Section 149 of the IPC regarding vicarious liability for acts committed in prosecution of a common object.

It relied on *Sikandar Singh v. State of Bihar* and *Subal Ghorai v. State of W.B.*, which established that while common object can form on the spur of the moment, courts must guard against roping in "passive onlookers".

Regarding witness credibility, the Court followed *Gajula Venkateswara Rao v. State of A.P.*, holding that the evidence of interested witnesses is not discarded but requires close scrutiny.

Finally, regarding oral dying declarations, it applied *Poonam Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh* and *Arun Bhanudas Pawar v. State of Maharashtra*, which dictate that such declarations are "weak evidence" requiring proof of the victim's mental/physical fitness.

The Court scrutinized the evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 6, finding their presence natural as they had come to collect certificates.

However, the Court rejected the "oral dying declaration" theory, noting the autopsy report showed brain laceration and lung perforation, making it unlikely the deceased was in a fit condition to murmur names; furthermore, the informant (P.W. 7) omitted this declaration in the fardbeyan.

Regarding "common object," the Court distinguished the roles of the appellants: Fiddu and Rajesh were identified as the actual shooters, corroborated by medical evidence of gunshot wounds.

For Rambrat and Jalendra, the Court found evidence only of physical assault (fists and kicks), noting the autopsy showed a ruptured bladder—a result of physical trauma—but found no evidence they shared the common object to *kill* via firearms.

However, the Court modified the conviction for Rambrat Yadav and Jalendra Yadav, acquitting them of murder (Sec 302/149) and the Arms Act, and instead convicting them under Sections 147 and 323 IPC for rioting and causing hurt.

They were sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment and six months simple imprisonment respectively, with the period already undergone to be set off.