Interim order modification cannot amount to final relief or direct dispossession without adjudication on merits.

The Appellants claim settled possession since 2000 over land at Khasra No. 696, District Gariyaband, based on Gram Panchayat resolutions and tax payments

On 17.05.2024, the Forest Authority issued an eviction notice alleging encroachment of 108 sq. meters

The Appellants challenged this in WPC No. 2907/2024, where a Single Judge initially stayed the eviction on 14.06.2024

However, on 08.01.2026, the Single Judge modified the stay, directing the Appellants to vacate the 108 sq. meters while keeping the rest of the stay intact

The Appellants filed this intra-court appeal arguing that the modification effectively granted final relief at an interlocutory stage

1. Whether the modification of an interim stay order to include a direction for dispossession amounts to a final adjudication of rights at an interlocutory stage.

2. Whether the learned Single Judge erred by failing to record findings on the three pillars of interim relief—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

The Court applied the principle that interim orders must not virtually dispose of the main matter or disturb settled possession in a manner prejudging the lis

It relied on State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi (2005) 9 SCC 733 and Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260 regarding the limitations of interim jurisdiction

Furthermore, it applied the doctrine of "settled possession" from Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu (2004) 1 SCC 769, which mandates that occupants cannot be dispossessed without due process of law

The right to livelihood under Article 21, as established in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545, was also considered

The Division Bench observed that the Single Judge's modification order travelled beyond the scope of interim adjudication by directing the Appellants to vacate the land before the writ petition was decided on its merits

The Bench found that the Single Judge failed to evaluate the Appellants’ long-standing possession (since 2000) and the balance of convenience, focusing solely on the lack of ownership documents

The Court reasoned that since the validity of the eviction notice itself was the subject of the writ, forcing the Appellants to vacate at this stage would cause "irreversible civil consequences" and render the main petition infructuous

The Bench concluded that the status quo must be maintained to preserve the subject matter of the lis until final disposal

The Court held that the initial stay order dated 14.06.2024 is restored in its entirety and shall remain in force until the final disposal of the writ petition

The Division Bench requested the Single Judge to dispose of the writ petition expeditiously, preferably within six weeks, without being influenced by observations made in this appeal