Interim orders subsisting during suit may be continued in appeal to maintain status quo and balance of convenience.

The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for perpetual injunction and damages regarding car parking spaces.

During the pendency of the suit, an interim order was passed on October 26, 2009, and November 24, 2010, which permitted the respondents/defendants to park two cars at a specific location subject to payment.

On March 18, 2026, the learned Trial Judge dismissed the suit.

The appellant filed the present appeal and an application (GA/1/2026) seeking to continue the protection of the interim order that had subsisted for approximately sixteen years until the dismissal of the suit.

The respondents opposed the stay, arguing a lack of merit in the application and citing precedent that interim orders need not be restored post-dismissal.

1. Whether an interim order that subsisted during the trial should be continued by the appellate court pending the disposal of the appeal after the suit has been dismissed.

2. Whether the appellant established a prima facie case and balance of convenience to warrant interim protection during the appellate stage.

The court considered the principles governing the grant of interim stay under the Code of Civil Procedure, focusing on the three-pillar test: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss.

The court distinguished the precedent Kashi Math Samsthan v. Shrimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy (2010) 1 SCC 689, which holds that if a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case at the interim stage, they are not entitled to an injunction solely on the basis of a previous status quo order.

The court applied the principle that if the non-continuance of an order would prejudice the parties or affect the subject matter of the lis, the status quo existing during the trial should be maintained.

The court distinguished the present case from the Kashi Math Samsthan precedent on its facts, noting that in the current matter, the parties had been adhering to a specific parking arrangement governed by court orders since 2009.

The bench reasoned that because the parties had regulated their conduct based on these orders for over a decade, a sudden cessation of such protection would be "prejudicial to the parties" and the "subject matter of the lis will stand affected".

The court found that the appellant’s claim of irreparable loss in paragraph 15 of the petition was sufficient and determined that the balance of convenience remained in favor of the appellant, as it had been so viewed by previous appellate interventions during the trial.

The court directed the appellant to prepare informal paper books within seven weeks and granted the respondents liberty to file cross-objections. IA No. GA/1/2026 was disposed of accordingly.