Interim Stay of Blacklisting Does Not Absolve Bidder’s Obligation to Disclose Prior Orders in Public Tenders.

The Petitioner participated in a tender initiated by the Respondent (NICSI) for empanelment of agencies for office support and project management services

The Petitioner submitted its bid on 30.12.2025

Previously, on 09.12.2025, the Petitioner was blacklisted by APEDA, an order it claims to have received on 22.12.2025

The Petitioner challenged this blacklisting in a separate writ, obtaining a stay on 29.12.2025

In its bid for the current tender, the Petitioner signed a declaration on 22.12.2025 stating it "has not been blacklisted or not under active blacklisting period"

The Respondent disqualified the Petitioner on 06.03.2026 for furnishing incorrect information

Following a court-directed representation, the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) affirmed the disqualification on 25.03.2026 (the Impugned Order)

1. Whether the Respondent's decision to technically disqualify the Petitioner on the ground of submitting an incorrect and incomplete disclosure regarding blacklisting warrants interference under Article 226

2. Whether an interim stay on a blacklisting order by a Court obliterates the factum of blacklisting for the purpose of tender disclosures

The court applied the principle that judicial review in contractual matters is limited to assessing if the decision-making process was arbitrary or mala fide

Clause 8.1(c) of the Request for Empanelment (RFE), which mandates summary rejection for false or incorrect information

The court further applied the doctrine from Bgr Deco Consortium v. Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation Ltd., which establishes that a judicial stay on a blacklisting order does not efface the underlying fact of the order's existence, and that the "author of the tender" is the best interpreter of its requirements

The Court observed that the Petitioner’s declaration was ambiguous, stating it "has not been blacklisted or not under active blacklisting," which failed to provide the clear, categorical disclosure required by the RFE

The Court reasoned that since the Petitioner was aware of the APEDA blacklisting order by 22.12.2025, it was obligated by the principle of "utmost candour" to disclose the factum of the order along with the subsequent stay

The Court rejected the argument that the interim stay of 29.12.2025 erased the history of blacklisting; a stay merely "eclipses" the operation of an order but does not "obliterate" the material fact of its issuance

Consequently, the TEC’s finding that the disclosure was incomplete and incorrect was deemed a plausible interpretation of the RFE conditions, precluding judicial interference

The Court held that an interim order does not dispense with the obligation of full disclosure in public procurement

The Writ Petition was dismissed, affirming that the TEC's decision was neither arbitrary nor perverse