Investigation orders under Section 26(1) are administrative directions and do not determine substantive rights.

The Petitioner challenged a Suo Moto order dated 13.08.2025 passed by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) under Section 26(1) read with Section 19 of the Competition Act, 2002

The CCI, acting on information received under Section 46 and following "dawn raids" by international authorities in March 2023, directed the Director General (DG) to investigate alleged labour-related bilateral coordination among fragrance manufacturers, including the Petitioner

The Petitioner argued that the CCI improperly condoned the delay in filing the information, claiming the three-year limitation period under the first proviso to Section 19(1) had expired and that merits cannot be considered when deciding limitation

Whether the CCI acted within its jurisdiction by condoning the delay in entertaining the information and directing an investigation under Section 26(1) of the Act

Whether a direction for investigation under Section 26(1) constitutes an adjudicatory order that affects the substantive rights of the parties involved

The court applied Section 19(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, noting the first proviso sets a three-year limitation period for information/references, while the second proviso empowers the Commission to condone delays upon showing "sufficient cause"

The court relied on the Supreme Court precedent in *CCI v. Steel Authority of India* (2010), which established that a Section 26(1) direction is a "direction simpliciter" of an administrative nature, akin to a departmental proceeding, which does not determine the rights or obligations of the parties

The court found that the CCI properly exercised its discretion under the second proviso to Section 19(1) by accepting the informant’s justification regarding internal investigations following March 2023 raids and prompt filing after the 2024 LPR Regulations were notified

Furthermore, the court noted the CCI’s finding that the alleged anti-competitive conduct might be ongoing, creating a "continuing cause of action" which negates a strict limitation bar

Applying the *SAIL* precedent, the court reasoned that since the investigation is at a preliminary, non-adjudicatory stage, no vested rights of the Petitioner had been infringed

Highlighting the narrow scope of judicial review under Article 226, the court refused to replace the expert body’s opinion with its own, finding no perversity or non-application of mind

The court affirmed that the Commission's mandate to prevent practices having an adverse effect on competition outweighed the procedural objections regarding limitation at this threshold stage