Joinder cannot confer territorial jurisdiction over independent causes of action.

The Plaintiff sued to recover amounts arising from a sale of goods to Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and from the subsequent transportation of the goods by Defendant No. 3.

It pleaded that the accepted Proforma Invoice was received in Delhi, part-payment was received in its Nehru Place bank account, and the unpaid balance was payable there.

The Commercial Court allowed Defendant Nos. 3 and 4’s application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC and returned the entire plaint for presentation in Mumbai, treating the claims as governed by the Multimodal Transportation of Goods Act, 1993 and as inseparable.

Whether the Delhi territorial connection pleaded for the sale-related cause of action could confer jurisdiction over the separate transportation-related causes of action through joinder

Whether the Commercial Court was justified in returning the entire plaint, or should have considered allowing the Plaintiff to amend the plaint or elect which claims to pursue in Delhi

Section 20(c) CPC permits suit where a material part of the cause of action arises; in contractual disputes, the place of contract, performance, or payment may supply that connection (A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies).

Sections 13, 25 and 29 of the Multimodal Transportation of Goods Act, 1993 respectively address specified liability of a multimodal transport operator, permissible forums for actions under the multimodal transport contract, and the Act’s overriding effect in case of inconsistency.

Order I Rule 3 and Order II Rule 3 CPC permit joinder in appropriate circumstances but do not enlarge territorial jurisdiction; each independent cause of action must have its own jurisdictional foundation (Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi; Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries; Carlsberg Breweries A/S v. Som Distilleries and Breweries Ltd.).

A court may, in an appropriate case, permit amendment to retain a cause of action within its jurisdiction (Paragon Rubber Industries v. Pragathi Rubber Mills).

The Court treated the buyer’s obligation to pay the sale price and the freight forwarder’s obligations under the multimodal transport arrangement as distinct legal relationships.

The pleaded receipt in Delhi of the accepted Proforma Invoice, part-payment there, and obligation to pay the balance there disclosed a sufficient territorial connection for the sale-side claim at the Order VII Rule 10 stage.

By contrast, claims concerning delivery, retention, rerouting, delay and transport charges arose from the transportation arrangement and required an independent jurisdictional basis; joinder and allegations of concerted conduct could not supply it.

Mumbai was a competent forum under Section 25(a) for an appropriate action under the multimodal transport contract, but the illegible Clause 23 and the post-dispute tax-invoice endorsement did not establish an exclusive forum-selection agreement on the record.

Because the Commercial Court had not considered whether the Plaintiff could amend the plaint or elect to retain claims maintainable in Delhi, returning the whole plaint was premature.

The suit and application were restored to the Commercial Court.

The Plaintiff was given liberty, within four weeks from the date fixed for appearance, to seek amendment or make an election; the Commercial Court must then determine territorial jurisdiction over the plaint as it stands, in accordance with the judgment.

If an independent cause of action lacking territorial jurisdiction in Delhi remains, the Commercial Court must pass an appropriate order concerning the plaint.

The Court left the merits of the claims and whether Mumbai could entertain the entire composite suit undecided.