Judicial review cannot reappraise disciplinary evidence or substitute punishment absent perversity or procedural violation.

The applicant, a Postal Assistant appointed in 1992, was serving as Sub-Postmaster, Bahoribandh.

Following an inspection, alleged embezzlement and forged withdrawals from post-office accounts were detected.

A charge-sheet dated 3 April 2008 was issued under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, alleging fraudulent withdrawals from the accounts of postal customers and misappropriation of ₹2,000 by receiving ₹10,000 instead of ₹8,000 towards RPLI payment and failing to credit the excess amount.

The respondents stated that a broader enquiry revealed embezzlement of ₹1,10,789 and that the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Bhopal, opined that the person who wrote the admitted signatures did not write the disputed signatures.

After a departmental enquiry, the charges were held proved.

The Disciplinary Authority imposed dismissal from service by order dated 11 August 2014; the applicant’s appeal and revision were rejected on 30 June 2015 and 30 August 2016, respectively.

The applicant challenged all three orders before the Tribunal, principally contending that the handwriting expert’s opinion had not been obtained, that one material witness had not been produced, and that the findings were unsupported by the evidence.

1. Whether the departmental enquiry and the orders of dismissal, appeal and revision were vitiated by violation of natural justice, insufficient evidence, or failure to obtain and properly consider handwriting-expert evidence.

2. Whether the Tribunal could reappreciate the evidence or interfere with the disciplinary authority’s findings and punishment in exercise of judicial review.

3. Whether dismissal from service was disproportionate to the proved misconduct involving embezzlement of Government funds.

The Tribunal applied Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, governing major-penalty disciplinary proceedings, and Rules 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, requiring Government servants to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and conduct becoming of a Government servant.

It relied on Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jai Raj Singh Chauhan, quoting Union of India v. Parma Nanda, for the rule that judicial review in disciplinary matters is not appellate review and that a Tribunal cannot interfere where the findings are not arbitrary or perverse and the enquiry complied with the rules and natural justice.

The Tribunal also relied on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and other authorities for the principle that courts and tribunals should not reappreciate evidence in disciplinary proceedings.

On proportionality, it applied State of Rajasthan v. Md. Ayub Naaz and Om Kumar v. Union of India, holding that interference with punishment is justified only where the penalty is legally impermissible or shockingly disproportionate.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had been afforded an opportunity to participate in the enquiry, cross-examine witnesses and submit his defence, and that the Disciplinary Authority had passed a reasoned and speaking order.

The applicant’s contention that no handwriting opinion had been obtained was rejected because the respondents produced the CFSL report, which concluded that the author of the admitted signatures was different from the author of the disputed signatures.

The Tribunal treated the proved fraudulent withdrawals and embezzlement, committed while the applicant was the sole in-charge of the post office, as serious misconduct involving Government funds and damage to the Department’s reputation.

Applying the limited scope of judicial review, it declined to reassess the evidence or substitute its own view for that of the disciplinary authorities.

It further held that dismissal was not shockingly disproportionate in view of the nature and gravity of the misconduct.

It held that the departmental proceedings complied with the applicable rules and principles of natural justice, that the charges were supported by material evidence including the CFSL opinion, and that the punishment of dismissal did not warrant judicial interference.

The Original Application was dismissed for lack of merit, with no order as to costs.