Judicial review cannot replace disciplinary findings where they are supported by some evidence.

The petitioner, an employee of the Metropolitan Transport Corporation, was proceeded against for alleged unauthorised absence from 13 March 2018, which was stated to have affected the regular operation of buses.

The proceedings arose after a wordy altercation and assault involving the petitioner and the Branch Manager, followed by criminal complaints and a dispute regarding the petitioner’s rejoining duty.

The petitioner contended that he had sustained injuries, applied for medical leave for the period from 12 March 2018 to 9 April 2018 by letter dated 17 March 2018, and was not permitted to resume duty thereafter.

Although the Corporation had contemplated placing the petitioner under suspension on 14 March 2018, the suspension order was admittedly not served or communicated to him.

The Corporation subsequently withdrew the unserved order in 2020 and maintained that the petitioner had never actually been suspended.

A departmental enquiry was conducted, but the petitioner did not participate on the scheduled dates despite being afforded opportunities, resulting in an ex parte enquiry report finding him guilty.

By order dated 23 July 2019, the second respondent imposed the punishment of stoppage of one annual increment with cumulative effect and treated the period from 14 March 2018 to 1 March 2019 as “no work, no pay”.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner’s absence during the relevant period could legally be treated as unauthorised absence when the Corporation had contemplated suspension but had not communicated any suspension order to him?

Whether the petitioner’s application for medical leave, which was not shown to have been rejected, invalidated the finding of unauthorised absence?

Whether the departmental enquiry and the punishment imposed were liable to be interfered with in judicial review under Article 226 on grounds of perversity, denial of natural justice, or disproportionality?

The Court applied the limited scope of judicial review over disciplinary proceedings under Article 226.

Relying on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 61, and The Indian Oil Corporation v. Ajit Kumar Singh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 478, the Court held that judicial review is not an appellate exercise and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or substitution of the disciplinary authority’s findings merely because another view is possible.

Interference is justified only where the findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, rendered by an incompetent authority, or arrived at in breach of natural justice; penalty may be reviewed only when it is shockingly disproportionate.

The Court also applied the principle that fairness of procedure, rather than correctness of the ultimate conclusion, is the primary concern in judicial review.

The Court found that no suspension order had been communicated to the petitioner; consequently, the period in question could not be treated as a period of suspension merely because the Corporation had internally contemplated suspension.

The petitioner therefore remained absent from duty, and the disciplinary authority was entitled to examine whether that absence was unauthorised.

Although the petitioner relied on his medical-leave application dated 17 March 2018, the record did not establish that he had raised or substantiated this defence during the departmental enquiry, nor could the respondents confirm that the leave application had been formally accepted or rejected.

The Court further held that the petitioner had been given adequate opportunity to participate in the enquiry, including the opportunity to summon the person whom he considered relevant, but failed to attend the hearings on 22 January and 15 February 2019.

In those circumstances, the ex parte enquiry and the finding of guilt were not perverse or contrary to natural justice.

Any alternative interpretation of the petitioner’s absence would, at most, constitute a possible alternative view and did not justify judicial interference.

It held that, since the proposed suspension had never been communicated, the petitioner’s absence could be treated as unauthorised; the unsubstantiated medical-leave claim did not displace the disciplinary finding; and the enquiry afforded sufficient procedural opportunity.

The punishment of stoppage of one annual increment with cumulative effect and the treatment of the period from 14 March 2018 to 1 March 2019 as “no work, no pay” were therefore not shown to be perverse, procedurally invalid, or shockingly disproportionate.

The writ petition was dismissed, with no order as to costs.