Judicial review under Article 226 cannot extend to re-appreciating evidence as an appellate authority.

The petitioner, a Head Master (Middle School), was deputed as a Returning Officer for a cooperative society election on December 26, 2012.

On January 2, 2013, election disturbances occurred, involving the looting of nomination forms by antisocial elements.

A complaint was filed alleging the petitioner’s negligence, leading to his suspension and a subsequent departmental enquiry.

The Enquiry Officer’s report dated October 16, 2014, found the charges partially proved, specifically noting that the petitioner reached the election site after the prescribed time.

Consequently, the District Collector (Respondent No. 4) passed an order on December 9, 2014, withholding two annual increments without cumulative effect.

The petitioner’s departmental appeal was dismissed on March 20, 2015.

1. Whether the District Collector was the competent disciplinary authority to impose punishment upon a Head Master under the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.

2. Whether the findings of the Enquiry Officer regarding the petitioner's delay and negligence were a sustainable basis for punishment under judicial review.

The court applied the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, specifically the Schedule appended thereto, which designates the District Collector as the disciplinary authority for the post of Head Master, Middle School.

The court relied on the precedent established in Govt. of A.P. and others v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan (2006) 2 SCC 373, which defines the scope of Article 226, holding that the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate evidence but must confine its review to errors of law, procedural irregularities, or violations of natural justice.

The Court rejected the petitioner's jurisdictional challenge, noting that per the statutory Schedule of the Rules of 1966, the District Collector is indeed the competent disciplinary authority for a Head Master.

Regarding the merits of the enquiry, the Court observed that the Election program for scrutiny was fixed between 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., and the petitioner admitted to arriving at 3:30 p.m.

The Court reasoned that a 30-minute delay constitutes "some delay" as noted by the Enquiry Officer, and thus the findings were consistent with the charges and the evidence.

Applying the Mohd. Nasrullah Khan doctrine, the Court determined that it could not re-evaluate the testimony of departmental witnesses or the Enquiry Officer’s factual conclusions since no manifest miscarriage of justice or procedural error was evident.

The Court held that the petition lacked merit as there were no grounds for interference under the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226; the writ petition was dismissed, and the impugned orders for withholding increments were upheld.