### Judicial Scrutiny of Orders Does Not Imply Personal Adverse Reflection on Trial Judges Absent Specific Observations

The applicant, a judicial officer (Additional Sessions Judge), sought the recall of a judgment dated 01.03.2023 or the expunction of remarks made therein

In the original judgment, the High Court had expunged remarks the applicant had made against a DCP regarding delays in FSL reporting, finding the police were not at fault

The applicant contended the High Court’s judgment was passed without notice to him, suppressed material facts regarding his efforts to ensure a speedy trial, and was circulated by the Registrar General using his specific name, which allegedly led to a downgraded Annual Confidential Report (ACR) and a transfer

Whether the High Court’s observations in the judgment dated 01.03.2023 constituted adverse remarks against the personal competence or integrity of the judicial officer

Whether the setting aside or modification of a Trial Court’s order by a superior court inherently reflects poorly on the judicial officer’s professional standing

The Court applied the principle of judicial hierarchy and the nature of appellate/supervisory jurisdiction

It relied on the Supreme Court precedent in *Sonu Agnihotri v. Chandra Shekhar and Ors. [2024 INSC 888]*, which distinguishes between the permissible criticism of erroneous judicial orders and the impermissible criticism of a Judicial Officer’s personal conduct

The Court also noted the deletion of Rule 6, Part H, Chapter I, Volume III of the Delhi High Court Rules and Orders via Notification dated 15.01.2025, which previously restricted courts from censuring police actions

The Court reasoned that judicial scrutiny is an essential feature of the Indian legal system where higher courts examine the legality of orders, not the personal caliber of the judge, unless expressly stated

It noted that in the original judgment, it had specifically found "no malafide" on the part of the applicant and attributed his strict approach to a bona fide anxiety regarding trial delays

The Court emphasized that it referred to the "learned Trial Court" rather than the officer by name, adhering to the principle that "judges preside over courts, and courts do not preside over judges"

Consequently, the modification of an order based on legal unsustainability does not permit an inference against a judge’s integrity

However, by way of abundant caution, the Court clarified that the observations in the 01.03.2023 judgment were confined to the merits of that petition and must not be treated as adverse remarks for the applicant’s ACR or service record

The Court further reiterated its standing instruction that the Registry must not mention the names of judicial officers in covering letters when circulating judgments to District Courts to avoid unnecessary embarrassment

The application was disposed of with these clarifications