Jurisdiction to grant interim relief in supplemental proceedings survives pending final determination of statutory bar.

The petitioner (State Bank of India) initiated recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, against respondents No. 3-5 (borrowers/mortgagors) after their loan account became an NPA.

The bank took symbolic possession of the suit property on 01.12.2025.

Respondents No. 1 and 2 (daughters of the original owner) filed a civil suit for declaration and partition, claiming the property was joint Hindu family property mortgaged without their consent.

The trial court, via order dated 22.12.2025, allowed an application under Section 94 read with Section 151 of the CPC, restraining the bank from alienating the property.

The bank challenged this order under Article 227 of the Constitution, arguing that Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act bars civil court jurisdiction.

Notably, the bank failed to disclose that its application for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC had already been dismissed by the trial court on 08.12.2025.

1. Whether the trial court could exercise power under Section 94 of the CPC to grant an interim injunction against a secured creditor despite the jurisdictional bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.

2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to discretionary relief under Article 227 when material facts regarding the dismissal of an Order 7 Rule 11 CPC application were suppressed.

Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, which excludes civil court jurisdiction regarding matters determined by the DRT.

Central Bank of India v. Smt. Prabha Jain (2025) 4 SCC 38, which clarifies that civil courts retain jurisdiction over partition and title suits that the DRT cannot adjudicate.

Preetpal Singh v. State of M.P. (1988 JLJ 549), establishing that Section 94 of the CPC allows courts to issue interim injunctions to preserve the status quo without first finalising the question of jurisdiction.

Doctrine of "clean hands" as elucidated in Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society (2013) 11 SCC 531, stating that suppression of material facts disentitles a litigant from judicial relief.

The Court observed that the petitioner, a nationalized bank, acted as an "unscrupulous litigant" by suppressing the trial court’s prior order dated 08.12.2025, which had already affirmed the maintainability of the suit.

The Court reasoned that since the bank had already challenged the maintainability issue separately via Civil Revision No. 264/2026, it could not re-agitate the same through this petition against a supplemental interim order.

On the merits of Section 94 CPC, the Court held that supplemental proceedings are intended to prevent irreparable injury and multiplicity of proceedings.

Following the precedent in Preetpal Singh, the Court clarified that a trial court has the inherent power to maintain the status quo via interim injunction even while the jurisdictional challenge remains pending.

The Court affirmed that Section 94 CPC proceedings are supplemental and do not require a final adjudication on the merits or jurisdiction of the main suit to grant protective interim relief.

The Court dismissed the miscellaneous petition, refusing to interfere with the trial court's order.