01Facts
The petitioner (State Bank of India) initiated recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, against respondents No. 3-5 (borrowers/mortgagors) after their loan account became an NPA.
¶ 2The bank took symbolic possession of the suit property on 01.12.2025.
¶ 3Respondents No. 1 and 2 (daughters of the original owner) filed a civil suit for declaration and partition, claiming the property was joint Hindu family property mortgaged without their consent.
¶ 2The trial court, via order dated 22.12.2025, allowed an application under Section 94 read with Section 151 of the CPC, restraining the bank from alienating the property.
¶ 1The bank challenged this order under Article 227 of the Constitution, arguing that Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act bars civil court jurisdiction.
¶ 4-5Notably, the bank failed to disclose that its application for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC had already been dismissed by the trial court on 08.12.2025.
¶ 8-902Issues
i.1. Whether the trial court could exercise power under Section 94 of the CPC to grant an interim injunction against a secured creditor despite the jurisdictional bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.
¶ 5/11ii.2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to discretionary relief under Article 227 when material facts regarding the dismissal of an Order 7 Rule 11 CPC application were suppressed.
¶ 12-1403Law Applied
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, which excludes civil court jurisdiction regarding matters determined by the DRT.
¶ 4Central Bank of India v. Smt. Prabha Jain (2025) 4 SCC 38, which clarifies that civil courts retain jurisdiction over partition and title suits that the DRT cannot adjudicate.
¶ 8/11Preetpal Singh v. State of M.P. (1988 JLJ 549), establishing that Section 94 of the CPC allows courts to issue interim injunctions to preserve the status quo without first finalising the question of jurisdiction.
¶ 17Doctrine of "clean hands" as elucidated in Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society (2013) 11 SCC 531, stating that suppression of material facts disentitles a litigant from judicial relief.
¶ 13Provisions in the judgment · 5 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 94Section 151
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 Section 13Section 17Section 34
04Reasoning
The Court observed that the petitioner, a nationalized bank, acted as an "unscrupulous litigant" by suppressing the trial court’s prior order dated 08.12.2025, which had already affirmed the maintainability of the suit.
¶ 12-14The Court reasoned that since the bank had already challenged the maintainability issue separately via Civil Revision No. 264/2026, it could not re-agitate the same through this petition against a supplemental interim order.
¶ 15On the merits of Section 94 CPC, the Court held that supplemental proceedings are intended to prevent irreparable injury and multiplicity of proceedings.
¶ 11Following the precedent in Preetpal Singh, the Court clarified that a trial court has the inherent power to maintain the status quo via interim injunction even while the jurisdictional challenge remains pending.
¶ 1705Holding
The Court held that the petitioner was ineligible for equitable relief under Article 227 due to the suppression of the material fact that their Order 7 Rule 11 application had been rejected.
¶ 14The Court affirmed that Section 94 CPC proceedings are supplemental and do not require a final adjudication on the merits or jurisdiction of the main suit to grant protective interim relief.
¶ 17The Court dismissed the miscellaneous petition, refusing to interfere with the trial court's order.
¶ 18Original Court PDF
State Bank Of IndiavsShrimati Rinshi Mittal W/O Shri Harsh
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