Jurisdiction under Section 340 CrPC persists notwithstanding withdrawal or disposal of the original judicial proceedings.

The Petitioner alleges that Respondent No. 1 filed a civil suit (O.S.No.4120/2022) by deliberately suppressing the fact that the dispute had already culminated in an arbitral award and subsequent dismissal of appeals under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

After the Petitioner appeared, the Respondent withdrew the suit.

The Petitioner subsequently approached the High Court under Section 340(2) of the Cr.P.C., contending that because the suit was withdrawn, the City Civil Court had become functus officio, leaving the Petitioner remediless to seek action for perjury and suppression of facts except through the High Court as the superior appellate authority.

The Court applied Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), which outlines the procedure for inquiring into offences affecting the administration of justice referred to in Section 195.

It emphasized the statutory interpretation of the phrase "in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court," noting that "in relation to" has a wider import than acts committed merely during pendency.

The court also referenced Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C., establishing that perjury and suppression are offences against public justice, the prosecution of which is a statutory mechanism to safeguard judicial sanctity.

The Court reasoned that the legislature's use of the phrase "in relation to" in Section 340(1) Cr.P.C. ensures that a court's jurisdiction is not circumscribed by the current stage or survival of a proceeding.

If jurisdiction were limited only to pending cases, the legislature would have used restrictive language like "during pending proceedings".

Consequently, even if a suit is withdrawn, the court in which the alleged offence occurred retains the jurisdiction to entertain an application for perjury because the statutory trigger is the commission of the offence in relation to the proceeding, not the active pendency of the lis.

The Court held that the City Civil Court did not become functus officio for the limited purpose of Section 340, as these proceedings are independent and distinct from the main suit.

Therefore, the Petitioner's move to the High Court under Section 340(2) was premature and misconceived, as the primary remedy remained with the trial court.

It answered the issues by stating that the trial court is not rendered functus officio by the withdrawal of a suit in matters of administration of justice.

The High Court disposed of the writ petition, reserving liberty for the Petitioner to file the appropriate application before the City Civil Court, with the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the time spent before the High Court.