01Facts
The Enforcement Directorate (ED) registered ECIR/BGZO/19/2025 following four predicate cases alleging betting and gambling activities, and later searched the petitioners’ premises, seized property and records, and froze bank accounts.
¶ 4–5 · pp. 16–19The petitioners contended that the predicate cases had been closed and challenged the search, seizure, freezing and retention, the ED’s application under Section 17(4) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), and the Adjudicating Authority’s show-cause notices under Section 8(1).
¶ 4–5 · pp. 16–19They also argued that the Adjudicating Authority was coram non judice because it comprised a single non-legal member.
¶ 5 · p. 19The ED opposed the petitions, relying on the PMLA’s statutory process and the availability of remedies under that Act.
¶ 6 · pp. 19–2002Issues
i.1. Whether the High Court should entertain the petitions challenging the seizure, retention and related PMLA proceedings when the Act provides statutory remedies.
¶ 8, 11–12 · pp. 20, 28–46ii.2. Whether the proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority were coram non judice because the Authority allegedly consisted of a single non-legal member.
¶ 13 · p. 4603Law Applied
Section 17(4) of the PMLA requires an application to the Adjudicating Authority for retention of seized property or continuation of freezing; Section 8 provides for notice, hearing and adjudication; and Sections 26 and 42 provide successive statutory appeals.
¶ 10.1, 12 · pp. 27–28, 35–40Under Article 226, the existence of an alternative remedy does not extinguish the High Court’s jurisdiction, but the Court ordinarily exercises restraint where an effective statutory remedy is available, absent exceptional circumstances such as patent lack of jurisdiction or a violation of natural justice.
¶ 15–19 · pp. 40–45The Court relied on JSW Steel Ltd. v. Enforcement Directorate, Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon Ltd., Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, and other authorities cited in the judgment for the principles of statutory primacy and restraint in intervening at an interlocutory stage.
¶ 11–12, 15–18 · pp. 28–45The question concerning the composition of the Adjudicating Authority was also before the Supreme Court in Union of India v. J. Sekar, and the High Court deferred its determination pending that decision.
¶ 13 · p. 46Provisions in the judgment · 21 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 12 provisions
Section 2Section 3Section 4Section 5Section 6Section 8Section 13Section 17Section 18Section 26Section 42Section 60Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 34Section 420Section 506
Information Technology Act, 2000 Section 66
KARNATAKA POLICE ACT, 1963. Section 78Section 79Section 80
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 528
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 173
04Reasoning
The Court treated the petitions as premature challenges to proceedings within the PMLA’s adjudicatory framework.
¶ 19–20 · pp. 44–46It held that the petitioners had not established an exceptional ground warranting immediate intervention, such as patent lack of jurisdiction, breach of natural justice or violation of the Act; the statutory remedies remained available to them.
¶ 19–20 · pp. 44–46The Court therefore declined to determine the merits of the petitioners’ objections to the ECIR, predicate offences, search or retention.
¶ 19–20 · pp. 44–46It likewise did not decide the coram non judice objection, reserving that question in view of the pending Supreme Court proceedings.
¶ 13 · p. 4605Holding
The High Court dismissed all the writ petitions and left the petitioners at liberty to pursue remedies available under law.
¶ 14 · p. 46 · order · p. 47It did not decide the challenge to the composition of the Adjudicating Authority, reserving that issue pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. J. Sekar.
¶ 13 · p. 46Original Court PDF
PUPPYS TOURS AND TRAVELS LLPvsUNION OF INDIA
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