Knowledge of likely death attributed to adult pressing child's chest during altercation warrants Section 304(II) conviction.

On May 4, 2013, following a verbal altercation, the appellant allegedly pressed the chest of the informant’s minor daughter, Hema Kumari, with his legs while also assaulting the informant and his wife.

The child died the following morning while being transported to the hospital.

The Trial Court (Additional Sessions Judge 3rd, Buxar) convicted the appellant under Sections 341, 323, and 304(II) of the IPC, sentencing him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment for the latter.

The appellant challenged this conviction on grounds of lack of independent witnesses, previous enmity, and lack of medical corroboration of chest injuries.

1. Whether the testimonies of related witnesses (parents) are sufficient for conviction in the absence of independent witnesses.

2. Whether the medical evidence regarding "death by suffocation" corroborates the ocular evidence despite the absence of external chest injuries.

3. Whether the act of pressing a minor’s chest satisfies the requirement of "knowledge" under Section 304(II) of the IPC.

The Court applied Section 304(II) (Culpable homicide not amounting to murder with knowledge but without intent), Section 323 (Voluntary causing hurt), and Section 341 (Wrongful restraint) of the Indian Penal Code.

It relied on the settled evidentiary principle that the testimony of "related witnesses" is admissible and can form the basis of conviction if found reliable and consistent.

the doctrine of "imputed knowledge," whereby an adult committing a violent act against a minor is presumed to know that such an act is likely to cause death.

The Court noted that despite P.W.1 and P.W.2 turning hostile, the testimonies of the parents (P.W.3 and P.W.6) remained "unshaken on material particulars" regarding the appellant pressing the child's chest.

Regarding medical evidence, the Court found that while P.W.5 (Doctor) found no specific chest injury, the cause of death—asphyxia due to suffocation leading to cardio-respiratory failure—aligned with the ocular description of the assault.

The Court rejected the defense’s "Asthma" theory as it was unsupported by medical records or prescriptions.

While the Court acknowledged the incident arose from a "sudden altercation" (negating specific intent), it held that jumping on the chest of a minor child carries the necessary "knowledge" that death is a likely consequence, justifies conviction under Section 304(II).

the Court reduced the sentence to the "period already undergone" [p. 8]. The appellant was discharged from his bail bonds, and the appeal was disposed of with a modification to the sentence.