Land transfers violating Gujarat’s Fragmentation Act till March 31, 2026 deemed regularised; Gujarat HC abates pending case

The petitioners challenged, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the order dated 23 June 2006 passed by the Prant Officer and the revisional order dated 27 February/1 March 2008 passed by the Special Secretary, Revenue Department, concerning alleged breach of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (“Fragmentation Act”).

The disputed sale deed was executed on 22 June 1990.

The private respondents contended that they had not executed the sale deed and that related proceedings were pending before the competent Civil Court.

During the pendency of the writ petition, the State issued a notification dated 14 July 2026 introducing amendments to Sections 5 and 9 of the Fragmentation Act.

Whether the transfer effected by the sale deed dated 22 June 1990 fell within the period covered by the amended Section 9(4) of the Fragmentation Act and was therefore deemed regularised.

Whether the pending proceedings under the Fragmentation Act were required to abate automatically, or whether the matter should be remanded to the revenue authority for reconsideration in light of the statutory amendment.

Whether the impugned orders passed by the Prant Officer and the SSRD were liable to be quashed and set aside.

The Court applied Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution governing judicial review and supervisory jurisdiction, together with Sections 5 and 9 of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947.

The amended Section 5(4) empowered the State Government to declare standard areas for specified classes of land by notification.

Amended Section 9(4) provided that transfers or partitions made contrary to the Fragmentation Act between 29 January 1948 and 31 March 2026 would be deemed regularised without penalty or premium, and that all pending proceedings before any officer or authority concerning such transactions would abate.

The Court also relied on Peter Augustine v. K.V. Xavier , 2025 INSC 771, for the principle that remand is not routine and should not be ordered where it would serve no useful purpose or unnecessarily prolong litigation.

The Court held that the 22 June 1990 transaction fell squarely within the statutory period specified in amended Section 9(4).

Since the provision expressly deemed such transfers regularised and directed that all pending proceedings concerning them abate, no factual reconsideration by the revenue authority was necessary.

The Court further observed that the transaction was treated as bona fide for the purpose of the revenue proceedings and that the original landowners had received the consideration; any dispute regarding execution or entitlement was capable of adjudication before the competent Civil Court and did not justify continuation of the Fragmentation Act proceedings.

Following Peter Augustine , the Court declined to remand the matter because remand would create multiplicity and defeat the object of the amendment.

The Court declared that, by virtue of amended Section 9(4) of the Fragmentation Act, the proceedings concerning the 22 June 1990 transfer stood abated, and it quashed and set aside the orders dated 23 June 2006 and 27 February/1 March 2008.

The Court clarified that any independent civil dispute concerning execution of the sale deed or the parties’ civil rights could be pursued before the competent court.