Landlord has absolute prerogative to choose suitable premises; tenant cannot dictate use of alternative accommodation.

The Petitioner (landlady) filed a revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (DRCA), challenging an order dated 24.02.2021 passed by the Ld. ARC, which dismissed her eviction petition.

The Petitioner sought eviction of the Respondent (tenant) from one room and a balcony on the first floor of Property No. 10528, Manakpura, Karol Bagh, for bonafide residential requirement.

The Petitioner, a senior citizen, alleged that she and her husband were residing in a single room/tin shed on the second floor, which was unsuitable due to her health and the need to accommodate her daughters.

She asserted that the ground floor was used for her husband’s labor job.

The Respondent contested the petition, alleging that the Petitioner had alternative accommodation on the ground floor and in Palam, and challenged the Petitioner's ownership.

The Ld. ARC dismissed the petition, holding that the Petitioner had suitable alternative space on the ground floor and had concealed material facts.

1. Whether the Ld. ARC erred in concluding that the Petitioner had "reasonably suitable alternative accommodation" on the ground floor, despite those rooms being utilized for business/livelihood.

2. Whether the Petitioner’s requirement for the first-floor premises on account of her age and health constitutes a bonafide need under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA.

Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which provides for eviction if the premises are required bonafide by the landlord for themselves or any family member dependent on them, provided no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is available.

The principle that a tenant cannot dictate how a landlord should utilize their premises.

The doctrine from Savitri Sahay v. Sachidanand Prasad (2002) 8 SCC 765, which establishes that a landlord has the legal right to prefer one portion of their property over another, and courts should not impose their own perception of "suitability" or "hardship" to override the landlord’s natural and sincere preference, particularly in cases involving elderly owners.

The High Court found that the Ld. ARC’s dismissal was "bereft of merits" as it ignored the Petitioner’s specific averment that the ground floor rooms were dedicated to the husband’s business for earning a livelihood.

The Court reasoned that the availability or subsequent letting out of commercial/ground-floor space for income does not disqualify a landlord from seeking eviction for residential needs on a preferred floor.

Applying Savitri Sahay, the Court emphasized that the Petitioner, as a senior citizen with health issues, has a legitimate right to seek accommodation on a lower floor (the first floor) to avoid climbing to the second floor.

The Court observed that the ARC failed to take a "practical approach" by treating business-use rooms as residential alternatives.

The Court noted that the Respondent failed to prove that the Petitioner had any other residential space that was truly suitable.

The Court held that the Petitioner successfully established a bonafide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA.

An eviction order was passed in favor of the Petitioner and against the Respondent for the demised premises.

Per Section 14(7) of the DRCA, the Court directed that the Respondent shall not be evicted before the expiry of six months from the date of the order.