Last-seen evidence alone cannot sustain conviction without corroborative evidence linking the accused to the crime.

The victim, a young woman from Rydak Tea Garden who suffered from epilepsy and was described as mentally slow, went missing on 30 September 2012 after leaving home to answer nature’s call.

Her partly or fully naked body was discovered in a betel-nut garden on 2 October 2012. The inquest and post-mortem established that she had been subjected to forceful sexual penetration and had died from the resulting injuries.

A formal FIR was lodged by her father only on 11 October 2012; neither the FIR nor the inquest report named the appellants.

The appellants, who lived in the same locality, had also become untraceable and were arrested in Delhi in December 2012.

The Trial Court convicted both appellants under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), and Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, sentencing them to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for rape and life imprisonment for murder, with the sentences to run concurrently.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants committed gang rape and murder of the victim under Sections 376(2)(g) and 302 read with Section 34 IPC, principally through circumstantial and “last seen” evidence.

Whether the evidence of PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9 was reliable and sufficient to establish the appellants’ connection with the crime.

Whether the appellants’ disappearance, their subsequent arrest in Delhi, and the alleged pointing out of the place of occurrence constituted incriminating circumstances under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Whether the medical and forensic evidence sufficiently linked the appellants to the rape and murder.

Whether the unexplained delay in registration of the FIR materially weakened the prosecution case.

The Court applied Sections 376(2)(g), 302 and 34 IPC concerning gang rape, murder and acts done in furtherance of common intention.

It held that a conviction based exclusively on circumstantial evidence requires a complete chain of circumstances that points irresistibly to the guilt of the accused and excludes reasonable alternative explanations.

Under the “last seen” doctrine, the time gap between the accused and deceased being last seen together and the discovery of death must be so narrow that the possibility of intervention by another person is substantially excluded; even then, corroboration is required, as stated in Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 INSC 417.

The Court relied on M.P. v. Balveer Singh, (2025) 8 SCC 545, and Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381, for the distinction between material contradictions, which may destroy credibility, and ordinary discrepancies.

Section 27 of the Evidence Act makes admissible only that portion of information from an accused in police custody which distinctly relates to a discovered fact; a place already known to the police cannot constitute a discovery, as explained in Perumal Raja v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 12.

The Court also considered the significance of Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, the evidentiary limitations of an alleged police confession not recorded before a Magistrate, and the statutory consequences of acquittal and release under Sections 428 and 437A CrPC.

The Court found that the prosecution established that the victim had been raped and murdered, but failed to prove that the appellants were the perpetrators.

PW-7 materially contradicted himself by stating in examination-in-chief that he came out after hearing a shout and saw the appellants, but stating in cross-examination that he did not leave his room; the alleged sighting also occurred at a location approximately one-quarter of a kilometre away and without adequate lighting.

His assertion that he found the body on 1 October was inconsistent with the evidence that it was discovered on 2 October.

PW-8’s alleged observation that the unarmed appellants were forcibly dragging the victim was treated as doubtful because he neither intervened nor informed anyone, despite knowing the victim and her vulnerability; moreover, the time gap between the alleged last-seen circumstance and the estimated time of death prevented the last-seen theory from completing the chain of evidence.

PW-9’s evidence that the appellants openly stayed with him, sold a mobile phone and disclosed their intended destination was considered insufficient and appeared artificially tailored to connect their later arrest in Delhi with the offence.

Their simultaneous disappearance from the village raised suspicion but did not establish guilt.

The alleged pointing out of the place of occurrence did not attract Section 27 because the place was already known and no incriminating object was recovered.

Although the medical evidence proved sexual assault and death, the biological samples, clothing and other material collected from the victim were not sent for forensic examination, leaving no scientific link between the appellants and the crime.

Finally, the unexplained nine-day delay in registering the FIR, after the body had already been recovered and the post-mortem conducted, further weakened the prosecution case.

The evidence of the principal witnesses was materially contradictory or unreliable; the appellants’ disappearance and arrest in Delhi were insufficient incriminating circumstances; the alleged discovery evidence was inadmissible or irrelevant; and the medical evidence did not connect the appellants to the offence.

The convictions under Sections 376(2)(g) and 302 read with Section 34 IPC, and the sentences imposed by the Trial Court, were set aside.

CRA 259 of 2017 was allowed, and the appellants were acquitted and directed to be released forthwith, subject to the requirements of Section 437A CrPC where applicable.