Leave to defend cannot rest on an unpleaded plea of additional accommodation.

The petitioner-landlord challenged an order dated 09 January 2019 by which the Rent Controller allowed the respondents-tenants’ application for leave to defend in an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”).

The Rent Controller treated the landlord’s requirement as a claim for “additional accommodation” because the landlord admittedly possessed an adjacent shop measuring approximately 8' × 8', and held that the adequacy of that accommodation required trial.

The landlord contended that the tenants had not pleaded the defence of “additional accommodation” in their leave application, supporting affidavit, or rejoinder.

The tenants conceded that the plea was not pleaded, though they claimed it had been argued orally before the Rent Controller.

1. Whether the Rent Controller could grant leave to defend by treating the landlord’s requirement as one for “additional accommodation” when that plea had not been raised in the tenants’ pleadings?

2. Whether the impugned order disclosed an error in the decision-making process warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act?

3. Whether the question of arrears was required to be adjudicated in the revision petition?

The Court applied Sections 14(1)(e), 25-B and the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

Revision under Section 25-B(8) is supervisory and not appellate; the High Court examines the legality, propriety and decision-making process of the Rent Controller and does not substitute its own view merely because another view is possible.

The Court relied on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, which recognise the restricted scope of revisional jurisdiction.

A plea forming the foundation of a triable issue, particularly a plea of additional accommodation, must ordinarily arise from the tenant’s pleadings; the Rent Controller cannot base leave to defend on a factual premise not pleaded by the tenant.

The Court found, on examining the leave application, supporting affidavit and rejoinder, that the respondents had not pleaded that the landlord’s claim constituted a case of additional accommodation or that the existing shop made his requirement non-bona fide.

Nevertheless, the Rent Controller independently characterised the case as one of additional accommodation and applied the principles in S.M. Mehra v. D.D. Malik and Santosh Devi Soni v. Chand Kiran, thereby granting leave to defend.

Since the factual premise underlying the Rent Controller’s reasoning had no foundation in the pleadings, the error affected the decision-making process itself and was not merely a disagreement concerning appreciation of evidence.

It therefore fell within the limited scope of revisional interference under Section 25-B(8).

The Court did not adjudicate the merits of any other possible triable issue and left the issue of arrears open for appropriate proceedings before the Rent Controller.

The impugned order dated 09 January 2019 was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Rent Controller for fresh consideration of the leave-to-defend application on the basis of the pleadings and material already on record.

The Rent Controller was requested to decide the application expeditiously, preferably within six months of receiving the order.

The issue of arrears was left open to be raised before the Rent Controller in appropriate proceedings.

The revision petition and pending applications were disposed of accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits or on whether any other triable issue arose.