Facts
The appellant was convicted by the Special Court (POCSO) cum Additional Sessions Judge, Kalimpong, in Special POCSO Trial No. 12/September/2019 arising from Special POCSO Case No. 13/2017, for an offence punishable under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”).
Source reference: paras. 1–3He was sentenced to imprisonment for life for the remainder of his natural life and a fine of ₹1,00,000, with four years’ imprisonment in default.
Source reference: paras. 1–3The prosecution alleged that the appellant repeatedly subjected his minor daughter to penetrative sexual assault, resulting in her pregnancy.
Source reference: para. 4The case was initiated on the written complaint of her maternal uncle, PW1, after the victim disclosed the assaults when her pregnancy became apparent.
Source reference: para. 4The victim, PW2, testified that her father forcibly raped her on three or four occasions, assaulted and threatened her when she resisted, and that she subsequently became pregnant and delivered a male child.
Source reference: paras. 7–9Her account was supported by PW1 and PW3, the medical evidence showing that she was approximately 15 years old and about 24 weeks pregnant, and the birth certificate recording her date of birth as 22 December 2002.
Source reference: paras. 10–12, 17–22The defence challenged, inter alia, proof of age, the absence of DNA profiling, inconsistencies regarding the timing of the FIR and occurrence, the victim’s stay at an NGO, the use of interpreters during recording of her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, and the absence of detailed evidence concerning the appellant’s arrest.
Source reference: paras. 14, 27, 37, 55, 65, 77, 86Issues
1. Whether the prosecution satisfactorily proved that the victim was below 18 years of age, thereby attracting the POCSO Act, despite the absence of a separate medical or ossification test for age determination?
Source reference: paras. 14–222. Whether the testimony of the victim, supported by the surrounding and medical circumstances, was sufficient to establish that the appellant committed repeated penetrative sexual assault upon her?
Source reference: paras. 23–36, 43–543. Whether the non-conduct of DNA profiling constituted a fatal omission in the prosecution case?
Source reference: paras. 27–334. Whether the alleged inconsistencies concerning the date of disclosure/FIR, the source of PW4’s information, the NGO’s involvement, the use of interpreters, and the particulars of arrest created a reasonable doubt or caused prejudice to the appellant?
Source reference: paras. 37–42, 55–855. Whether the appellant was entitled to interference with the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court?
Source reference: paras. 95–104Law Applied
The Court applied Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, which prescribes punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault, and Section 29 of the POCSO Act concerning the statutory presumption once the foundational facts are established.
Source reference: paras. 95–99The Court held that minority may be proved through reliable documentary, oral and medical evidence and need not invariably depend upon an ossification or other scientific test, relying on Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah.
Source reference: paras. 15–22It relied on Sunil v. State of M.P., (2017) 4 SCC 393, for the principle that failure to conduct DNA profiling does not automatically invalidate the prosecution where other evidence is cogent and reliable.
Source reference: paras. 27–33The Court applied the principle that the credible and trustworthy testimony of a prosecutrix can independently sustain a conviction without mandatory corroboration, relying on Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh.
Source reference: paras. 43–44It treated a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as non-substantive evidence usable for corroboration and contradiction, while recognising its enhanced reliability because it is recorded by a Magistrate, in accordance with Vijaya Singh v. State of Uttarakhand.
Source reference: paras. 51–53The Court also relied upon Section 281 Cr.P.C. and Rules 4(5) and 5 of the POCSO Rules, 2020, concerning interpretation, translation and the child’s placement in a safe environment.
Source reference: paras. 65–85Finally, it held that investigative omissions do not vitiate a trial absent demonstrated prejudice to the accused.
Source reference: paras. 37–42Reasoning
The Court found the victim’s age proved through the contemporaneous birth certificate, her own evidence, and PW13’s medical assessment that she was approximately 15 years old; the absence of an ossification test was therefore immaterial.
Source reference: paras. 17–22PW2 gave a specific and substantially unshaken account of repeated forcible intercourse, physical assault and threats by her father.
Source reference: paras. 23–36, 45–53Her delayed disclosure and failure to raise an alarm were considered consistent with her age, vulnerability, dependence upon the appellant and the threats alleged by her.
Source reference: paras. 23–36, 45–53The pregnancy, medical findings and subsequent birth of a child materially supported her account, while the suggested possibility that the pregnancy resulted from another person was held to be speculative and unsupported by evidence.
Source reference: paras. 86–94The absence of DNA evidence did not create an automatic benefit of doubt because the victim’s direct testimony and the corroborative evidence were found reliable.
Source reference: paras. 27–33The discrepancies regarding dates were treated as minor and natural in the testimony of a rustic witness, and PW4’s hearsay knowledge was considered relevant only to explain the subsequent disclosure and not as proof of the assault itself.
Source reference: paras. 55–64The victim’s placement with CINI was viewed as a protective measure consistent with the POCSO framework, not as evidence of tutoring, particularly in the absence of proof of manipulation or prejudice.
Source reference: paras. 65–73Similarly, the use of interpreters during the Section 164 Cr.P.C. proceedings was treated as a procedural safeguard, and the lack of detailed evidence about arrest was regarded as a collateral investigative omission causing no demonstrated prejudice.
Source reference: paras. 37–42, 77–85Holding
The Court held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant repeatedly committed penetrative sexual assault upon his minor daughter and that the foundational facts for applying the POCSO Act and its statutory presumption were established.
The appeal was dismissed, and the Trial Court’s judgment of conviction dated 27 September 2021 and order on sentence dated 28 September 2021 were affirmed, including life imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant’s natural life and the fine of ₹1,00,000.
Source reference: paras. 101–104The Court additionally directed the Trial Court to ensure strict confidentiality and non-disclosure of the victim’s name, identity and identifying particulars in all future proceedings and documents.
Source reference: paras. 105–109Acts & Sections Cited
6 provisions across 2 statutes referred to in this judgment. Each provision opens on LawLens.
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 20122
Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734
Original Court PDF
JIWAN RAIvsState of West Bengal
Click to open original judgment
Original judgment, available to read, download and summarize on LawLens.in
