Litigant negligence precludes condonation of delay notwithstanding allegations of counsel’s inaction.

The Respondent (landlord) filed a suit for possession, arrears of rent, and mesne profits against the Appellant (tenant) regarding a property in Burari, Delhi.

The Appellant defaulted on rent from August 2014, and the tenancy was terminated in July 2015.

The Appellant contended that his status shifted from tenant to prospective buyer under an Agreement to Sell dated 07.08.2014, asserting he had paid ₹11,00,000 out of a ₹12,00,000 consideration.

The Trial Court closed the Appellant’s right to lead evidence due to repeated defaults and decreed the suit in favor of the Respondent on 13.02.2025.

The Appellant filed a first appeal on 30.07.2025—approximately 132 days after the decree—along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, finding that the Appellant had provided false dates regarding when he applied for certified copies and failed to show "sufficient cause".

The Appellant then preferred this Regular Second Appeal.

1. Whether the First Appellate Court committed a patent illegality or error of law in refusing to condone the delay in filing the first appeal.

2. Whether the Appellant demonstrated "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to warrant the exercise of judicial discretion.

The court applied Order XLI Rule 3A of the CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which requires an appellant to satisfy the court of "sufficient cause" for not preferring an appeal within the prescribed period.

It relied on Ram Lal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962), establishing that once limitation expires, a valuable right accrues to the decree-holder that should not be lightly disturbed.

Furthermore, the court cited Salil Dutta v. T.M. and M.C. Private Limited (1993), holding that the rule protecting a party from a counsel’s misdemeanor is not absolute and does not apply if the party is personally negligent.

The Court found that the Appellant failed to act with the requisite diligence. Although the Appellant claimed he applied for the judgment’s certified copy in February 2025, court records proved he only applied on 17.05.2025—well after the 30-day limitation period had already expired.

The Court rejected the plea of "counsel's negligence," noting that the Appellant did not substantiate this claim and had a history of lack of diligence, as evidenced by his failure to lead evidence during the trial.

Regarding the substantive defense, the Court observed that even if an Agreement to Sell existed, it did not alter the Appellant's status from a tenant to an owner until a Sale Deed was executed; thus, the pending suit for possession did not defeat his independent right to seek specific performance elsewhere.

The Court concluded that the First Appellate Court’s refusal to condone a gross, unexplained delay was a reasonable exercise of discretion, as equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.

Finding no substantial question of law, the Court dismissed the Regular Second Appeal and upheld the order dated 17.10.2025.