Long delay is sufficient ground to reject a claim for compassionate appointment.

The appellant’s father, a Village Assistant, died in service on 2 February 2003.

The appellant’s mother applied for compassionate appointment on 20 May 2005, but the application was not considered.

W.P. No. 3197 of 2014 was dismissed; a second writ petition, W.P. No. 704 of 2024, was filed after a further lapse of about ten years and was also dismissed.

The appellant challenged that dismissal in this writ appeal.

The respondents opposed the appeal, citing the appellant’s age and the delay in pursuing the claim.

Whether the appellant was entitled to compassionate appointment despite the substantial delay following his father’s death in service.

Whether the Court should interfere with the dismissal of the second writ petition, given that the earlier writ petition had also been dismissed.

The Court stated that compassionate appointment is a concession, not a vested right, and that the applicable scheme must be implemented strictly according to its terms and conditions.

Long delay, by itself, may justify rejecting an application; the passage of time may support an inference that the penurious circumstances caused by the employee’s death have ceased.

No statute or precedent was expressly cited in the judgment.

The father died in 2003, the compassionate appointment application was made in 2005, and the second writ petition was filed in 2024 after the earlier writ petition had been dismissed in 2014.

Applying its stated principles, the Court treated the prolonged delay and the prior dismissal as sufficient grounds to reject the claim.

It found no infirmity in the order dismissing the second writ petition.

The writ appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs.