Long-pending injunction applications must be decided expeditiously, followed by an expedited trial.

The respondents-plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit No. 399 of 2019 before the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, seeking damages of ₹500 crore, together with interest at 18% per annum from the date of filing until realization, allegedly on account of defamation.

An application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, filed below Exhibit 5, remained undecided.

The petitioners-defendants approached the Gujarat High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, seeking expeditious disposal of the injunction application and the suit, including a day-to-day trial schedule.

The defendants had also filed a purshis dated 24 July 2025 below Exhibit 94, undertaking, without prejudice and without admitting the allegations, not to publish the email dated 19 July 2019 pending early disposal of the proceedings.

1. Whether, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should direct or facilitate expeditious hearing and disposal of the pending injunction application and the suit instituted in 2019.

2. Whether the defendants should be permitted to seek stoppage of interest on any future decretal amount for the period during which the plaintiffs’ default or negligence causes delay in the proceedings.

3. Whether directions could be issued without notice to the plaintiffs where the directions were considered non-adverse and beneficial to them, while preserving their right to seek recall or modification.

The Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to ensure proper and timely progress of proceedings before the subordinate court.

It applied the procedural requirement under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that an interlocutory injunction application should be considered expeditiously because delay may defeat its purpose.

The Court also applied the general principle that an old suit should be expedited in the interests of justice and that a party responsible for delaying proceedings may be liable to have the consequences of such delay considered, including in relation to interest on a future decree.

The petitioners referred to Yash Pal v. Sushila Devi & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 4296 of 2023, in seeking day-to-day trial directions, but the judgment does not independently set out or apply a substantive holding from that precedent.

The Court noted that the suit had been pending since 2019 and that even the injunction application had not been heard or decided.

Since the purpose of interim relief could be frustrated by prolonged non-determination, the Court considered early decision of the injunction application necessary if the plaintiffs continued to press it.

The defendants’ purshis undertaking not to publish the disputed email was treated as demonstrating their willingness to facilitate early disposal rather than as an admission of the plaintiffs’ case.

Instead of directly deciding the interlocutory application or prescribing a detailed trial calendar, the Court relegated the defendants to the Trial Court with liberty to file an application for expediting the injunction proceedings and the suit.

The Trial Court was directed, after hearing the parties, to expedite the injunction application and thereafter the trial on its own merits.

To address delay attributable to the plaintiffs, the Court also preserved the defendants’ right to seek an order stopping accrual of interest for the period of established default or negligence, subject to hearing and determination by the Trial Court.

The Trial Court was directed, after hearing the parties, to expedite and decide the injunction application on merits and thereafter expedite the trial.

If delay thereafter resulted from the plaintiffs’ default or negligence, the defendants were granted liberty to seek stoppage of interest on any amount ultimately decreed, for the period of such delay; the application was to be decided in accordance with law after hearing the parties.

Although the order was passed without notice to the plaintiffs, the Court held that it was not adverse to them and allowed them to seek recall or modification within 15 days of receiving the order.