01Facts
The appellant, a construction supervisor, was accused of having sexual relations with the prosecutrix, a construction worker, on a promise of marriage, causing her to become pregnant, and later refusing to marry her.
p. 2The prosecutrix, aged 27 at the time, testified that she knew before the relationship began that the appellant was married and had two children, and that the relationship continued for about a year.
p. 2The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 376 and 506(i) of the IPC, but acquitted him under Section 417; it imposed ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine under Section 376, and six months’ simple imprisonment under Section 506(i). The appellant challenged the convictions and sentences on appeal
pp. 2–302Issues
i.Whether the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court were sustainable
p. 3ii.Whether the prosecutrix’s consent to sexual intercourse was vitiated by a false promise of marriage, such that the offence under Section 376 IPC was made out
pp. 4, 6–8iii.Whether the evidence independently established criminal intimidation under Section 506(i) IPC
p. 903Law Applied
Section 375 IPC requires absence of consent for rape; under Section 90 IPC, consent is vitiated where it is given under a misconception of fact and the accused knows, or has reason to believe, that it was so given
p. 4Relying on Uday v. State of Karnataka, Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar, Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, and Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court stated that a promise of marriage vitiates consent only where it was false from the outset, induced the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act, and had a direct nexus to that decision; a good-faith promise later unfulfilled does not constitute rape.
pp. 4–6Consent must involve a conscious and voluntary choice, and the alleged misconception must be sufficiently proximate to the sexual act
pp. 4–6Section 506(i) IPC requires proof of criminal intimidation, including a threat intended to cause alarm.
p. 9Provisions in the judgment · 6 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 347
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 90Section 375Section 376Section 417Section 506
04Reasoning
The Court found that the prosecutrix knew of the appellant’s existing marriage and children before the relationship began and remained in the relationship for about a year; it considered this inconsistent with consent having been induced by a misconception that the appellant could lawfully marry her.
pp. 6–7It also relied on her delayed disclosure, made when her pregnancy was advanced, and her evidence of a police-station settlement discussion involving compensation, concluding that the prosecution had not proved absence of consent beyond reasonable doubt.
pp. 7–8The Court further held that no evidence independently established a threat intended to cause alarm; it therefore found the Section 506(i) conviction unsustainable as well.
p. 905Holding
The Court held that the prosecution had not established the absence of consent required for an offence under Section 376 IPC and that the evidence did not sustain the charge under Section 506(i) IPC.
pp. 8–9It allowed the appeal, acquitted the appellant of both charges, set aside the trial court’s judgment, discharged his bail bond, and ordered that any fine paid be refunded.
p. 10Original Court PDF
PonrajvsThe Inspector of Police
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