Madras HC Quashes Charges Against Advocate After Sexual Act In His Office Was Accidentally Streamed Into Virtual Court

A video showing the petitioner, an advocate, engaged in an erotic act with “X” during a virtual court hearing went viral on social media.

The CB-CID registered a case and, after investigation, filed a final report charging him under Sections 228, 294(a), 354A and 370(2) IPC, Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 1998, and Section 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000; the charge under Section 292(2)(a) IPC had been dropped because the person who recorded and circulated the video was not traced.

The petitioner had also been convicted of contempt, sentenced to imprisonment and a fine, and directed to pay compensation to “X”; the contempt was later purged.

He sought to quash the pending trial under Section 528 BNSS, contending that the materials did not disclose the charged offences and that continuation of the prosecution would be an abuse of process.

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 preserves the High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

Under State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, quashing may be justified where the allegations, accepted at face value, do not constitute an offence or the uncontroverted material does not disclose one; under Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, the Court must not conduct a mini-trial but must examine whether the alleged facts satisfy the ingredients of the offences.

The Court also applied the statutory elements of Sections 228, 294(a), 354A and 370 IPC, Section 4 of the TNPHW Act, and Section 67A of the IT Act.

It observed that contempt proceedings and prosecution for statutory offences are distinct, so the strict bar against double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 337 BNSS did not apply; the Court could nevertheless consider whether the prosecution was oppressive or an abuse of process.

The Court found no material that the petitioner knowingly intended to interrupt judicial proceedings, defeating the intent required for Section 228 IPC.

It held that the alleged act occurred in the petitioner’s private office and that the record did not show he knowingly exposed it to the virtual court or that any participant was annoyed, so Section 294(a) IPC was not made out.

The materials did not show that the petitioner recorded, forwarded, or intentionally caused the video to be transmitted, nor that he knowingly streamed it; accordingly, Section 67A was not established.

The final report did not particularise conduct satisfying Section 354A IPC, and the alleged office setting and absence of disclosed harassment also failed to establish Section 4 of the TNPHW Act.

Finally, the allegations of offering money, clothing, and food to “X” did not establish recruitment, transportation, harbouring, transfer, or receipt for exploitation—the conduct required for trafficking under Section 370 IPC.

Although contempt did not create a strict double-jeopardy bar, the Court considered the prior contempt sanction and the deficient criminal materials in concluding that trial would serve no purpose and would be oppressive.

It allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings in Spl.S.C. No. 326 of 2025, insofar as they concerned the petitioner; the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.