Madras High Court directs Tamil Nadu to form high-level panel to review vigilance department after delayed bribery complaint and abandoned trap നടപടി

The petitioner, a trader in broken rice, alleged that the fifth respondent, an Inspector of Police, Civil Supplies CID, demanded ₹5 lakhs—and subsequently ₹3 lakhs—for not arraying him as an accused in Crime No.157 of 2025 concerning the alleged illegal transportation of PDS rice concealed in a consignment of broken rice.

On 14 July 2025, the petitioner approached the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption (DVAC), which supplied him with an audio-recording device and deputed a Head Constable to accompany him to meet the fifth respondent.

The alleged demand was recorded, and the petitioner produced ₹1 lakh as proposed trap money on 15 July 2025; however, the DVAC did not conduct the trap.

The DVAC later claimed that the petitioner’s antecedents and his alleged payment of monthly “mamool” to the fifth respondent required verification under Paragraph 42(2) of the Vigilance Manual.

The petitioner’s complaint was reduced into writing on 15 July 2025, factual verification was completed only on 25 August 2025, and a Detailed Enquiry was registered on 28 November 2025 after the authorities obtained approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The Detailed Enquiry was completed on 15 June 2026, recommending proceedings against both the fifth respondent and the petitioner.

The petitioner sought transfer of the investigation to the CBI, alleging that the DVAC had deliberately shielded the fifth respondent.

The Court applied Paragraph 44(1) of the Vigilance Manual, requiring an oral complaint disclosing demand of illegal gratification by a public servant to be reduced into writing.

Paragraph 42(2), which permits verification of a complainant’s antecedents as a precaution but does not make adverse antecedents a ground to abandon a legitimate trap.

Under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, prior approval is required only where the alleged offence is relatable to a recommendation or decision taken by a public servant in the discharge of official functions or duties; allegations of demand or acceptance of illegal gratification do not attract that requirement.

The Court relied on CBI v. Santosh Karnani, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 427, and Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 INSC 72, for the principle that Section 17A does not apply to bribery allegations.

K. Athinarayanan v. State, W.P.(MD) No.34197 of 2025, for the rule that where information discloses a cognizable offence, its credibility cannot ordinarily be tested before taking investigative action.

Dhandapani v. Vigilance Commissioner, W.A.(MD) No.903 of 2021, for the principle that Section 17A does not protect acts which themselves constitute an offence.

CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, (2021) 18 SCC 135, for the proposition that a preliminary enquiry is not mandatory where the information prima facie discloses a cognizable corruption offence.

The Court also relied on Som Parkash v. State of Delhi, (1974) 4 SCC 84, recognising trap proceedings as an important method of detecting and proving bribery offences.

The Court found that the DVAC was aware of the petitioner’s alleged antecedents before it supplied the recording device, arranged the meeting, and monitored the alleged demand.

Having treated the complaint as sufficiently credible to facilitate the recording and accept the proposed trap money, the DVAC could not subsequently abandon the trap on the same ground of antecedents.

The Court held that the recorded conversation, the presence of a vigilance officer, and the availability of the proposed trap amount constituted material requiring prompt investigative action; the petitioner’s status as a possible bribe-giver did not justify inaction against a public servant who allegedly demanded money.

The failure to reduce the oral complaint into writing, the delay in factual verification, the failure to collect available evidence such as call-detail records, and the repeated movement of the Section 17A proposal were treated as serious administrative and investigative deficiencies.

The Court further held that the alleged demand for money to refrain from arraying the petitioner as an accused, and the alleged receipt of monthly “mamool,” were not decisions taken in the lawful discharge of official duties; therefore, Section 17A approval was unnecessary.

Nevertheless, because the Detailed Enquiry had already concluded and proceedings had been recommended against both parties, transferring the matter to the CBI would cause duplication, restart the investigation, and create further delay.

The Court therefore declined transfer while expressly disapproving the DVAC’s handling of the complaint and directing institutional review.

The writ petition was consequently disposed of without costs, but the Court recorded serious findings regarding the DVAC’s delay, abandonment of the trap, failure to follow the Vigilance Manual, and erroneous invocation of Section 17A.

The Chief Secretary was directed to constitute, within four weeks, a High-Level Committee to review the DVAC’s leadership, tenure policy, manpower, decentralisation, investigative capacity, trap mechanisms, Section 17A procedures, accountability for delay, technological modernisation, and protection of complainants.

The Committee was directed to submit its report within four months of constitution, after which the Government was to take appropriate action within three months.

The matter was directed to be listed for reporting compliance in the second week of April 2027, with a status report from the Chief Secretary.