### Magistrate Cannot Add or Subtract Sections at Cognizance Stage in Cases Based on Police Reports

The petitioner was appointed as a Laboratory Technician in the office of the Civil Surgeon, Bokaro, based on a certificate from the "Institute of Medical Technology".

Upon verification, the certificate was found to be forged; the registration number provided (No. 132 of 2001) actually belonged to an unrelated organization, "Mahila Samajik Sewa Samiti".

A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged, and following an investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet.

The Judicial Magistrate, Bermo at Tenughat, took cognizance of offences under Sections 419, 420, 466, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC on May 4, 2017.

The petitioner moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the entire criminal proceeding, claiming he was unaware the institute was unauthorized and that it operated under a resolution by the Mahila Samajik Sewa Samiti.

Whether the criminal proceedings and the order of cognizance should be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the grounds that the petitioner lacked mens rea regarding the forged nature of the certificate.

Whether a Magistrate, at the stage of taking cognizance based on a police report, has the power to add or subtract sections of law.

Whether the protections granted to students of ultra vires universities in Priyanka Kumari v. State of Bihar apply to certificates issued by an unauthorized private society.

The court primarily applied the principle that a Magistrate taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. on a police report cannot add or subtract sections; such alterations are only permissible at the stage of framing charges under Sections 216, 218, or 228 Cr.P.C., as established in State of Gujarat v. Girish Radhakrishnan Varde (2014).

The court further applied the settled law that the High Court cannot conduct a "mini-trial" or appreciate evidence under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as reaffirmed in State of U.P. v. Akhil Sharda (2022).

Additionally, the court invoked the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of law is no excuse) regarding the institute's lack of statutory authority.

The court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Priyanka Kumari v. State of Bihar, distinguishing it by noting that while those students attended a university created by a (later invalidated) State Act, the petitioner’s institute was never established by any competent legislative authority.

The court observed that the "Mahila Samajik Sewa Samiti," being a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, had no legal power to authorize a medical technology institute; thus, any such permission was non est.

Regarding the cognizance order, the court held that since the police found prima facie evidence of forgery and cheating during the investigation, any arguments regarding the specific sections of the IPC applied must be addressed at the stage of framing charges, not during a Section 482 petition.

The court determined that the petitioner’s claim of innocence/lack of knowledge constituted a factual defense that required trial and could not be adjudicated through the summary jurisdiction of the High Court.

It held that the High Court cannot interfere with the trial court's cognizance when the investigation has revealed complicity in forgery.

The court specifically ruled that the appropriate forum for the petitioner to challenge the applicability of specific penal sections is the trial court at the stage of framing charges.

The prayer to quash the proceedings was denied.