### Magistrate Empowred to Stop Proceedings and Discharge Accused Under Section 258 CrPC in Summons Cases.

The petitioner, the registered owner of a truck (MP-09-GG-5625), was implicated in RCT No. 1279/2019 following an accident involving his driver.

While the driver faced charges under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, the petitioner was charged under Sections 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act for allegedly failing to have a valid insurance policy at the time of the incident (31.10.2019).

During trial, an application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. was allowed, bringing the insurance policy onto the record, which proved the vehicle was insured from 05.03.2019 to 04.03.2020.

The petitioner subsequently filed for discharge.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vidisha, rejected the application on 08.01.2025, holding that there is no provision for "discharge" in summary/summons cases.

The petitioner challenged this order under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The Court primarily applied Section 258 of the Cr.P.C., which empowers a Magistrate to stop proceedings in certain summons cases (instituted otherwise than upon complaint) at any stage, resulting in a release that has the effect of a discharge.

It relied on Municipal Council, Raipur v. State of M.P. (AIR 1970 SC 1923), which establishes that courts are not expected to mechanically continue proceedings if allegations are not justified.

The Court also invoked Kamala Rajaram v. D.Y.S.P. (2010 (2) KLT 655), holding that Sections 251 and 258 Cr.P.C. collectively allow for the discontinuation of proceedings to prevent injustice.

The Court also invoked Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (2010) 9 SCC 368, regarding the duty of the court to apply its judicial mind to the materials on record rather than acting as a mouthpiece for the prosecution.

The Court reasoned that while Section 227 Cr.P.C. (discharge) specifically applies to Sessions trials, the Magistrate is not legally handcuffed in summons cases.

Under Section 258 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate possesses the statutory authority to stop proceedings if the foundation of the prosecution is demolished.

In this instance, the sole allegation against the petitioner was the lack of vehicle insurance under Sections 146/196 of the MV Act.

However, the record—verified via the Section 91 Cr.P.C. application—conclusively proved that the vehicle was covered by a valid policy on the date of the accident.

The Court found that the Magistrate’s refusal to consider this evidence on a "technical ground" (the lack of a "discharge" stage) was a failure to exercise judicial mind.

Since the essential ingredients of the offence were absent, forcing the petitioner to endure a trial was deemed unnecessary harassment and an abuse of the process of law.

It held that a Magistrate must exercise powers under Section 258 Cr.P.C. when the material on record clearly establishes that no offence is made out, even in summons cases.

The Court directed the Magistrate to stop proceedings against the petitioner and ordered his release, which shall have the effect of a discharge.

The trial against the driver (remaining accused) was ordered to proceed independently.