Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to direct departmental action or summon officials after accepting a closure report.

The petitioners, high-ranking police officials (DCP and Addl. DCP), challenged four orders passed by the ACJM-02, Patiala House Courts.

The ACJM was presiding over three FIRs filed under Section 303(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

On 15.11.2025, the ACJM accepted the "Untrace/Cancellation Reports" filed by the Police, noting the complainants’ satisfaction.

However, the ACJM observed that the reports were filed in Court by the Investigating Officer (IO) after a delay of more than one year from when they were forwarded by the ACP.

Despite accepting the final reports, the ACJM continued the proceedings to monitor departmental action against the “erring official,” eventually summoning the Addl. DCP and seeking replies from the DCP.

The court primarily applied Section 193 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which dictates the procedure upon filing a police report.

It relied on Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra, which limits a Magistrate’s options upon receiving a final report to: accepting the report, taking cognizance despite the report, or directing further investigation.

It further referred to the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 and the Delhi Police Act, 1978, which grant sole discretion over disciplinary matters to the police department.

Additionally, it cited State of U.P. v. Assn. of Retd. Supreme Court and High Court Judges and Notification No.119/Rules/DHC (2025) regarding the restricted circumstances under which government officials may be summoned to court.

The Court reasoned that once the ACJM accepted the Untrace/Cancellation Reports on 15.11.2025, he had exercised one of the three permissible legal options, thereby rendering himself functus officio.

Since the acceptance of the report resulted in the "closure" of the case for all purposes, the ACJM lacked the legal authority to keep the matter pending or initiate a "de-novo enquiry" into administrative lapses.

The court noted that while the ACJM might have acted for a "good cause," the manner was legally impermissible as it encroached upon the exclusive jurisdiction of disciplinary authorities under the Delhi Police Rules.

Furthermore, the court found the summoning of the Addl. DCP contrary to the 2025 Rules, which discourage routine personal appearances of officials when affidavits suffice.

The Court held that the ACJM overstepped his jurisdiction by venturing into administrative/departmental functions after the judicial proceedings had reached finality via the acceptance of the cancellation reports.

However, the Court clarified that the Police Department remains free to independently pursue disciplinary action against the IO in accordance with the Delhi Police Act and Rules.