Magistrates may summon persons omitted from the charge-sheet at cognizance on prima facie material.

Respondent No. 2 alleged that he invested approximately ₹7.50 crore in M/s Affinity Beauty Salon Pvt. Ltd. (“ABSPL”) in 2016, and that the investment was not returned and ABSPL’s funds and business proceeds were diverted.

The petitioner was associated with M/s M.S. Luvish Construction Pvt. Ltd., which had licensed premises to ABSPL. He stated that ABSPL owed licence fees and that, in late 2018, card-swipe machines belonging to M/s Living Liquidz Foods and Beverages Pvt. Ltd., of which he was a director, were used at ABSPL’s Pali Hill outlet, with receipts to be adjusted against the outstanding dues.

Approximately ₹16.76 lakh was received through those machines.

The police filed its final report without naming the petitioner as an accused, but the Trial Court summoned him for offences under Sections 409 read with 120-B IPC, relying principally on the swipe-machine arrangement and alleged diversion of proceeds. He sought quashing of that order under Section 528 BNSS.

Whether the Trial Court could summon the petitioner, who was not charge-sheeted, at the stage of taking cognizance without proceeding under Section 319 CrPC.

Whether the material before the Trial Court disclosed sufficient grounds to summon the petitioner for offences under Sections 409 read with 120-B IPC, warranting refusal to quash the summoning order.

Section 528 BNSS preserves the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process, while *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal* identifies circumstances for quashing, including where allegations, even if accepted, do not disclose an offence.

Under *M/s SWIL Ltd. v. State of Delhi* and *Nahar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, a Magistrate may, at the cognizance stage, summon a person not named in the police report if the material before the Court prima facie indicates involvement; this is distinct from summoning an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC during inquiry or trial.

*Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate* and *Lalankumar Singh v. State of Maharashtra* require the summoning order to reflect application of judicial mind and sufficient grounds for proceeding, although detailed reasons are not necessary.

Under *Kailash Kumar Sanwatia v. State of Bihar*, criminal breach of trust requires entrustment or dominion over property and dishonest misappropriation or conversion; Section 409 IPC additionally requires the relevant capacity specified in that provision.

Criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC requires an agreement to commit an illegal act, or a lawful act by illegal means, which may be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances but not presumed merely from a business association.

The Trial Court acted at the cognizance stage, when it could independently assess the investigation material and was not bound by the police decision not to charge-sheet the petitioner; Section 319 CrPC was therefore not a prerequisite.

The alleged use of Living Liquidz machines to receive ABSPL outlet proceeds, together with the allegation of concert with Vishal Sharma, supplied the basis identified in the summoning order.

The petitioner’s contractual-dues explanation and the timing and amount of the transactions were relevant, but their disputed character prevented their determination on the quashing application.

The Court did not treat the petitioner’s directorship or receipt of funds as conclusive proof of entrustment, dishonest misappropriation, or conspiracy; those matters remained for the Trial Court to assess at the appropriate stage.

It concluded that the brief summoning order identified the transaction underlying the allegations and that the disputed defence did not justify quashing at that stage.

The petition was dismissed, pending applications were disposed of, and the Trial Court was directed to consider the material and statutory ingredients independently, without being influenced by the High Court’s observations.