Mala fide criminal proceedings used to weaponise a landlord–tenant dispute constitute abuse of process.

Respondent No. 2, the authorised signatory of a salon partnership, occupied commercial premises owned by the petitioner under a registered lease.

The parties had ongoing disputes concerning electricity, maintenance, parking, and rent, alongside civil proceedings and earlier police complaints.

Respondent No. 2 alleged that on 28 May 2024, the petitioner and about 60 others forcibly entered the premises and removed salon property and staff mobile phones.

Police registered Crime No. 194/2024 for offences under Sections 143, 147, 392, 441, 120B and 149 IPC.

The petitioner sought to quash the FIR under Section 482 CrPC, contending that the complaint was a counterblast to a landlord–tenant dispute and contained vague allegations against him.

1. Whether the complaint and accompanying material disclosed a prima facie case against the petitioner for the alleged IPC offences

2. Whether the FIR was an abuse of process, having allegedly been lodged to give a criminal colour to a civil landlord–tenant dispute and warranting quashing under Section 482 CrPC

Section 482 CrPC empowers the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any court and secure the ends of justice.

Under State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, an FIR may be quashed, among other circumstances, where its allegations do not disclose an offence, are inherently improbable, or the proceedings are manifestly mala fide and instituted for an ulterior purpose.

The Court also relied on Bikku Bhai Govinda Bhai v. State of Gujarat, which recognises that criminal proceedings may be quashed where a predominantly civil property dispute is given a criminal colour and continuation would amount to abuse of process.

Mohammed Ali v. State of U.P. was cited for the principle that, when mala fides or vexatious proceedings are alleged, the Court may consider relevant attending circumstances and material on record, while distinguishing that exercise from assessing the reliability of evidence at trial.

The Court noted the undisputed landlord–tenant relationship and the pending civil dispute.

It considered that the property allegedly removed was brought to the police station in three lorries, and that the petitioner’s demand notice for alleged rent and maintenance arrears was served on 25 May 2024—three days before the complaint was lodged.

In light of these circumstances, the Court found that the complaint prima facie appeared to be a counterblast arising from the civil dispute and intended to give it a criminal colour.

Applying the principles in Bhajan Lal and the cited authorities, it concluded that continuing the proceedings against the petitioner would amount to abuse of process.