### MANDATORY ENQUIRY UNDER SECTION 202 CrPC IS NOT REQUIRED IN COMPLAINTS FILED BY PUBLIC SERVANTS

The case arose from a complaint regarding misbranded vaccines manufactured by Panacea Biotec Ltd.

In 2006, a consumer reported that while the outer carton was labeled as "Easy Five" (Pentavalent), the inner vial was labeled "Easy Four" (Tetravalent).

The Drugs Inspector conducted an investigation to identify the supply chain and the specific offenders, concluding the identification process by April 2006.

A formal complaint was filed in January 2009.

The High Court of Kerala quashed the proceedings against the respondents primarily because they resided outside the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction, and the Magistrate had failed to conduct a mandatory inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C.

A connected matter involving Veekay Surgicals was also quashed on similar grounds and for insufficient compliance with Section 34 of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act.

1. Whether the primary complaint was barred by limitation under Sections 468 and 469 of the Cr.P.C.

2. Whether the mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) of the Cr.P.C. is required when the complainant is a public servant acting in official discharge of duty.

3. Whether the High Court could quash proceedings against Directors under Section 34 of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act at the summoning stage.

The Court applied Section 469(1)(c) of the Cr.P.C., which stipulates that limitation commences on the first day the identity of the offender is known to the aggrieved person or investigating officer.

It relied on Section 32 of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940, defining who can institute prosecution.

Crucially, the Court harmonized Section 200 with Section 202(1) of the Cr.P.C., applying the principle from *Cheminova India Limited v. State of Punjab* (2021), which holds that public servants are placed on a different pedestal; thus, the exemptive proviso of Section 200 also influences the necessity of inquiry under Section 202.

Section 34 of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act regarding vicarious liability of persons in charge of a company was also considered.

Regarding limitation, the Court reasoned that under Section 469(1)(c), the 3-year clock only began ticking on April 18, 2006, when the identity of all accused persons was finalized through investigation, making the January 2009 filing timely.

Regarding Section 202, the Court held that the High Court erred in treating the inquiry as a mandatory hurdle for public servants.

Since Section 200 Cr.P.C. expressly waives the examination of a public servant, and because the complaint was backed by official investigation/reports, they stand on a different footing than private complainants.

The Court found the *Birla Corporation* precedent inapplicable as it involved a private complainant.

Regarding the liability of Directors under Section 34, the Court observed that "in-charge" status is a question of fact to be determined during trial, making the High Court's quashing premature.

It held that: (i) the complaint was within the limitation period as per Section 469(1)(c).

(ii) the mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) is not an absolute requirement when a complaint is filed by a public servant in their official capacity.

and (iii) the determination of vicarious liability of Directors must be left to the Trial Court.

The Court directed the concerned Magistrate to issue fresh summons and proceed with the trial.