Material inconsistencies in prosecutrix's testimony and unexplained delay in lodging FIR warrant dismissal of leave to appeal acquittal.

The State filed an application under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C. seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 29.11.2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Beena.

The prosecution alleged that on 31.12.2015, the respondent attempted to sexually assault the minor prosecutrix (P.W.3) near Maruti Temple, Beena.

Following an investigation and a three-day delay in filing the FIR, the respondent was charged under Sections 354 and 354D of the IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012.

The Trial Court acquitted the respondent, citing material contradictions between the prosecutrix's Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and her court testimony.

1. Whether the State has made out strong and compelling reasons to grant leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal.

2. Whether the Trial Court’s findings regarding the unreliability of the prosecutrix’s testimony were perverse or manifestly illegal.

The court primarily applied Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C. regarding the grant of leave to appeal against acquittal.

If two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted.

The court also considered the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, 2012, noting it stands rebutted if the foundational testimony is found to be untrustworthy.

The High Court examined the Trial Court’s reasoning and found it to be based on a detailed evaluation of evidence.

The court noted substantial inconsistencies between the prosecutrix’s (P.W.3) statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and her deposition during the trial, which affected the core of the prosecution's case.

The court highlighted that the three-day delay in lodging the FIR remained unsatisfactorily explained.

The High Court reasoned that because the testimony of P.W.3 and her mother (P.W.2) was unreliable and lacked corroboration, the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Applying the standard for appeals against acquittal, the court determined that the Trial Court's view was plausible and did not suffer from perversity or legal error.

The presumption of innocence is strengthened by an acquittal and should not be interfered with unless the findings are wholly unreasonable. Consequently, the application for grant of leave under Section 378(3) Cr.P.C. was dismissed, and the proposed criminal appeal was rejected at the threshold.