Material suppression of prior adverse orders and ownership disputes disentitles a plaintiff to equitable injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff, Elder Prroject Limited, filed a suit for infringement and passing off regarding its registered device mark (a stylized "ELDER" with three leaves), claiming exclusive use since 1992-93.

On September 26, 2025, the Plaintiff obtained an ex-parte ad-interim injunction and appointment of a Court Receiver.

The Defendant, Elder Neutraciticals Private Limited (directed by the Plaintiff-director's sister), moved to vacate the injunction under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC.

The Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff suppressed material facts, including: (i) that Elder Pharmaceuticals Ltd (EPL), now in liquidation, was the original owner of the "ELDER" mark;

(ii) that the Plaintiff’s director admitted in Delhi High Court proceedings that the Plaintiff was a mere contract manufacturer for EPL until 2016;

(iii) that the Delhi High Court had previously denied the Plaintiff injunctive relief for the "ELDER" mark, labeling the Plaintiff a "senior infringer."

Whether the Plaintiff is liable to have the ex-parte ad-interim injunction vacated due to the suppression of material facts under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC?

Whether the Plaintiff established a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury to entitle it to a temporary injunction?

The Court applied the first Proviso to Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC, which mandates the vacation of an ex-parte injunction if it was obtained through false or misleading statements regarding material particulars.

It relied on the "Clean Hands" doctrine and the principle of full and fair disclosure for equitable relief as established in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India.

The principle from Keval Ashokbhai Vasoya v. Saurabhakti Goods Pvt. Ltd., which holds that an applicant must present a fair and even-handed case, including anticipated defenses.

Regarding trademark law, the Court applied Section 33 of the Trade Marks Act concerning acquiescence.

The principle from Lupin Limited v. Johnson and Johnson that a court can scrutinize the validity of a registration at the interim stage.

The Court also invoked the doctrine of Approbation and Reprobation from Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam, prohibiting litigants from taking contradictory stands across different proceedings.

The Court found the Plaintiff guilty of "gross suppression".

Specifically, the Plaintiff failed to disclose four adverse orders from the Delhi High Court where its claims to the "ELDER" mark were rejected, and it was found to be an infringer.

The Plaintiff’s claim of using the mark since 1992-93 was belied by its own director’s sworn statement before the Delhi High Court and the Official Liquidator, admitting to being a mere contract manufacturer for EPL until March 2016.

The Court rejected the Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish between the "ELDER" word mark and its registered device mark, noting that the Plaint itself sought to restrain the use of the word "ELDER" in any combination.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff's contradictory stands—claiming rights to the EPL mark in Delhi while disclaiming them before the Official Liquidator—shattered the Court's "faith" in the litigant.

The Court concluded that if these facts were known, the ex-parte order would never have been granted.

The Court vacated the ad-interim injunction dated September 26, 2025, and dismissed the Plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction (IA (L) No. 27598/2025).

The Court ordered the discharge of the Court Receiver and the return of seized goods to the Defendant.

Due to the Plaintiff’s deliberate non-disclosure and misuse of the Court's exceptional ex-parte powers, the Court imposed costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendant.