Mechanically granted sanction without application of mind vitiates prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

On 29 July 1995, the Food Inspector visited Quality Provision Store, allegedly operated by Respondent No. 1, and purchased a sample of Gayatri Brand groundnut oil.

The sample was divided into three sealed bottles in the presence of panch witnesses and sent for analysis.

The Public Analyst reported that the sample did not conform to the prescribed standards, including the detection of castor oil and an adverse T.L.C. test.

After obtaining sanction under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (“PFA Act”), the Food Inspector filed Criminal Case No. 374 of 1996 against the respondents, comprising the retailer and persons associated with the manufacturing firm.

The trial court acquitted all accused, principally finding deficiencies concerning service of the Section 13(2) notice, the accused persons’ connection with the offence, and the prosecution evidence.

The State preferred an appeal against the acquittal.

1. Whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the accused on the basis of the evidence on record.

2. Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution.

3. Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal suffered from illegality, irregularity, or perversity warranting appellate interference.

4. Whether the prosecution was vitiated by an invalid sanction under Section 20 of the PFA Act and by deficiencies relating to the statutory right of re-analysis under Section 13(2).

The prosecution was required to establish the alleged adulteration offences under Sections 2(ia)(a), 2(ia)(c) and 2(ia)(l), punishable under Section 16 of the PFA Act.

Section 20 required a valid written consent or sanction from the competent authority before institution of prosecution; such sanction must reflect due consideration of the relevant material and application of mind, and a mechanical sanction vitiates the prosecution.

Section 13(2) of the PFA Act protected the accused’s right to have the sample examined by the Central Food Laboratory after receipt of the Public Analyst’s report, requiring effective and timely communication of the report and statutory opportunity.

The Court relied on State of Gujarat v. Prajapati Amratlal Natvarlal, 2008 (1) GLR 765, and Ganpatbhai T. Prajapati v. Food Inspector, 2005 (3) GLH 389, for the requirement of active application of mind in granting sanction.

On appeals against acquittal, the Court applied the principles in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, reaffirmed in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169: although an appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence and an acquittal should not be disturbed where two reasonable views are possible.

The High Court found that the prosecution’s own evidence disclosed material defects in the institution and proof of the case.

Although the sample was analysed on 31 August 1995, the report was communicated to the respondents only on 12 April 1996, after approximately eight months, thereby raising a serious issue regarding the effective exercise of their Section 13(2) right.

The Food Inspector also admitted that Respondent No. 3 was a sleeping partner not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the oil mill, while Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were minors at the relevant time.

These material facts were not placed before the sanctioning authority, and the sanction order did not demonstrate proper application of mind; consequently, the sanction under Section 20 was legally defective.

Respondent No. 1 was merely the retailer, and the oil was sold from a sealed pack; he had produced documents indicating purchase from Respondent No. 2.

The prosecution therefore failed to establish that Respondent No. 1 had manufactured, adulterated, or sold the oil in circumstances attracting criminal liability.

Applying the restrictive appellate standard applicable to acquittals, the Court held that the trial court’s view was a reasonable one and was neither perverse nor manifestly erroneous.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged PFA Act offences beyond reasonable doubt and that the sanction, the statutory notice procedure, and the individual involvement of the accused were insufficiently established.

The State’s appeal was dismissed, the trial court’s judgment of acquittal was confirmed, the bail bonds were cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.