Medical evidence alone cannot establish guilt absent proof of minority, enticement, and the accused’s involvement.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant enticed a girl aged approximately 17 years, took her away, married her, and had sexual intercourse with her.

The victim’s mother stated that the girl was studying in the 11th standard and had gone missing, following which a complaint was lodged by her father.

The victim was subsequently traced and handed over to her parents, but she later committed suicide at her parental home during the investigation and therefore could not be examined at trial.

The prosecution relied on medical evidence, including an ossification-based age certificate stating that the victim was above 16 and below 18 years of age, and a medical certificate indicating that she had been subjected to sexual intercourse.

The appellant was charged under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

The Special Court convicted him and imposed concurrent sentences, including life imprisonment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a child below 18 years of age for the purposes of the offences under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act and the POCSO Act?

Whether the trial court could rely upon an unmarked document, allegedly relating to the victim’s birth, to establish her age?

Whether the prosecution proved that the appellant had enticed or taken away the victim and was the person who had sexual intercourse with her?

Whether the evidence on record was sufficient to sustain the appellant’s convictions under Sections 363 and 366 IPC, Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, and Section 6 of the POCSO Act?

The Court considered Sections 363 and 366 IPC, which require proof of taking or enticing a minor and, in the case of Section 366, the requisite intent relating to marriage or illicit intercourse; Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, concerning the male adult’s marriage with a child; and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, concerning aggravated penetrative sexual assault against a child.

The Court applied the principle that the victim’s minority must be proved through legally admissible and reliable evidence, and that an ossification test is not conclusive because it carries an accepted margin of error of approximately two years on either side.

Relying on Umesh Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 3048, and the principle stated in Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Government of Jammu Kashmir, the Court held that medical age determination cannot, by itself, establish an exact age.

The Court further held that an unmarked document cannot be relied upon as evidence.

The Court further held that medical evidence showing sexual intercourse does not, without more, identify the accused as the perpetrator.

The prosecution was required to prove each ingredient of the charged offences beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the victim’s exact date of birth.

Although her mother and brother stated that she was 17 years old, no school certificate or other reliable documentary evidence was produced.

The only formal age evidence was the ossification report, which merely placed her age above 16 and below 18 years and was subject to the recognised margin of error.

The trial court had additionally relied on an unmarked birth-related document, which the High Court held was impermissible because it had not been properly introduced into evidence.

The Court also held that the evidence did not establish that the appellant had enticed or taken the victim away.

The testimony of the victim’s mother and brother was not based on direct knowledge, and the remaining evidence did not reliably prove the alleged marriage or that the appellant and the victim lived together.

Although the medical evidence indicated sexual intercourse, it did not prove that the appellant was the person who had committed the sexual act.

In the absence of reliable proof of the victim’s minority, the appellant’s identity as the person who enticed her, and his connection with the alleged sexual assault, the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offences beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant was acquitted of the offences under Sections 363 and 366 IPC, Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.

Any fine paid by the appellant was directed to be refunded, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.