Mere abuse without intent to provoke breach of peace does not constitute an offence under Section 504 IPC.

On 8 December 2017, the de facto complainant alleged that, while returning home after voting, the applicants intercepted her due to a prior dispute, abused her, held her hand, slapped her, and threatened to kill her and her husband.

Several persons allegedly intervened.

The complainant informed her husband later and lodged the FIR on 10 December 2017 at Anjar Police Station, District Kachchh (East), for offences under Sections 323, 504, 506(2), 354A and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

The applicants invoked Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking quashing of the FIR.

The de facto complainant, though served, did not appear; the State opposed the application.

1. Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclosed the ingredients of the offences under Sections 354A and 504 IPC so as to justify continuation of the proceedings.

2. Whether the FIR and the allegations of slapping and threatening the complainant made out a prima facie case under Sections 323 and 506(2) read with Section 114 IPC, warranting refusal to quash those parts of the FIR.

3. Whether the case fell within the illustrative categories in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal for exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

The Court applied Section 482 CrPC, under which the High Court may quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice, subject to the principles in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, including cases where the FIR, even if accepted in its entirety, does not prima facie constitute an offence or discloses only non-cognizable offences.

Section 354A IPC requires conduct amounting to sexual harassment, such as unwelcome physical contact involving explicit sexual overtures, a demand for sexual favours, showing pornography against a woman’s will, or sexually coloured remarks.

Section 504 IPC requires intentional insult coupled with an intention or knowledge that the resulting provocation is likely to cause breach of public peace or commission of another offence.

Sections 323 and 506(2) IPC respectively concern voluntarily causing hurt and criminal intimidation by threats of death or grievous hurt; Section 114 IPC attributes liability to an abettor present when the offence is committed.

Applying the Bhajan Lal principles, the Court held that the FIR did not allege any sexual overture, demand for sexual favours, pornography, or sexually coloured remarks.

The allegation that the complainant’s hand was held, without the requisite sexual element, therefore did not satisfy Section 354A IPC.

The allegation of abuse also did not disclose the essential requirement under Section 504 IPC that the insult was intended or known to be likely to provoke breach of peace or commission of another offence; mere abuse was insufficient.

Conversely, the allegations that the complainant was slapped and threatened with death, in the presence of named witnesses, were sufficient at the prima facie stage to constitute offences under Sections 323 and 506(2) read with Section 114 IPC.

The Court therefore declined to assess disputed factual issues or quash those offences.

The FIR, C.R. No. II-242/2017 dated 10 December 2017, was quashed and set aside qua the applicants only insofar as it alleged offences under Sections 504 and 354A IPC.

The proceedings concerning Sections 323, 506(2) and 114 IPC were allowed to continue, with the Court observing that the law would take its own course.

Rule was made absolute to that limited extent.