Mere acquittal in corruption cases creates no automatic entitlement to back wages for suspension or dismissal periods.

The petitioner, a Sanitation Superintendent with the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), was booked under Sections 7, 12, 13(d), and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on June 4, 1998.

Consequently, he was suspended on July 2, 1998, and later reinstated on March 19, 2002, following a review.

On September 19, 2002, a Special Judge convicted him, leading to his dismissal from service on February 25, 2003.

During the pendency of his criminal appeal, the petitioner reached the age of superannuation on June 13, 2007.

On January 24, 2017, the High Court quashed his conviction in Criminal Appeal No. 817 of 2002.

Following his acquittal, the AMC issued an order on March 27, 2019, treating his suspension (1998–2002) and dismissal-to-superannuation (2003–2007) periods as "spent on duty" for continuity of service and retiral benefits, but granted these benefits only on a notional basis, denying actual arrears of pay and increments.

The petitioner challenged this denial of actual monetary benefits.

1. Whether the order dated March 27, 2019, granting only notional benefits for the periods of suspension and dismissal following the petitioner’s acquittal, is sustainable in law.

Rule 5(2)(a) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline Appeal) Rules, 1971, which governs suspension following arrest.

The principle established in Banshidhar v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 1 SCC 324, which holds that back wages are not automatic upon acquittal and must be determined based on the facts of each case, particularly when a delinquent is legally disabled from rendering service due to conviction.

Rajnarain v. Union of India (2019) 5 SCC, stipulating that an employer cannot be saddled with back wages upon an employee's acquittal unless the prosecution was malicious or launched at the behest of the department.

Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan (2012) 13 SCC, which affirms that suspension is justified during the pendency of a criminal trial involving serious charges.

The Court reasoned that the petitioner’s suspension and subsequent dismissal were inevitable legal consequences of his arrest and conviction under the Corruption Act, rather than being dehors the rules or malicious.

The Court observed that the prosecution was not initiated by the Corporation with "vexatious intent" but arose from the petitioner's own conduct as a public servant.

Applying the "no work, no pay" logic within the context of criminal disability, the Court noted that during the period of conviction, the petitioner was "legally disabled" from rendering service to the institution.

Citing Banshidhar, the Court emphasized that grant of back wages is a discretionary exercise and not a right.

Since the Corporation had already granted continuity of service and retiral benefits (gratuity, pension) by treating the period notionally as duty, the Court found that the employer should not be further burdened with the financial liability of full back wages for a period where no service was rendered due to the petitioner's involvement in a corruption case.

The High Court found no illegality in the AMC’s order dated March 27, 2019, concluding that the grant of notional benefits was just and legally sustainable under the circumstances.

The petition was dismissed, and the rule was discharged.