Mere application creates no appointment right, and an unchallenged cancellation order cannot be reviewed.

Birsa Agriculture University advertised posts in 2019, and the petitioners applied and participated in the recruitment process.

The University did not publish results, stating that the process had been stopped on directions from the Governor’s Secretariat and that a fresh advertisement was issued in 2023.

The 2023 process was also stopped following a direction from the State Government; the University later stated that the advertisement had been cancelled with effect from 15 June 2023, by an order dated 27 January 2026.

The petitioners sought mandamus for publication of the 2019 results and completion of the 2023 recruitment process.

They did not challenge the 27 January 2026 cancellation order in this proceeding.

Whether the petitioners were entitled to mandamus directing publication of the results of the 2019 recruitment process.

Whether the Court could examine the validity of the cancellation of the 2023 advertisement when the petitioners had not challenged the order dated 27 January 2026.

Under Shankarsan Das v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47, selection or participation in a recruitment process does not ordinarily confer an indefeasible right to appointment, and an employer is not legally bound to fill vacancies; however, a decision not to fill vacancies must be bona fide and based on appropriate reasons.

The Court also proceeded on the principle that it could not examine the legality or validity of the cancellation order in the absence of a challenge to that order.

The Court found that no results or select list had been issued and, consequently, the petitioners had acquired no right through the recruitment process.

Their participation and submission of applications were insufficient, by themselves, to establish entitlement to appointment or to the requested mandamus.

Because the petitioners had not challenged the order cancelling the 2023 advertisement, the Court declined to examine its validity and could not grant relief premised on that process continuing.

It granted liberty to the petitioners to challenge the order dated 27 January 2026, if so advised; any pending interlocutory application was also disposed of.