Mere long possession does not ripen into title absent proof of hostile animus.

The plaintiffs (respondents) filed a civil suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession regarding 2.50 acres of land (Khasra No. 66/48)

They contended the land was the self-acquired property of their late father, Gandoram, who permitted the defendant’s father to cultivate it out of sympathy

The plaintiffs, belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, alleged the defendant was in unauthorized possession

The defendant (appellant) filed a counter-claim seeking title via adverse possession, asserting his father had cleared the land 60 years ago and maintained continuous, hostile possession

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs and dismissed the counter-claim

This was affirmed by the First Appellate Court

The appellant subsequently filed this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC

Whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the plaintiffs' title and the defendant's unauthorized possession were perverse or contrary to law

Whether the defendant established the essential legal ingredients to perfect title by way of adverse possession

Whether the appeal presents any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure

The Court primarily applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which restricts the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeals to "substantial questions of law"

Regarding adverse possession, the Court applied the principle that mere long possession does not ripen into title unless it is open, continuous, and hostile to the true owner (animus possidendi)

furthermore, it relied on the precedent of State of Rajasthan and Others v. Shiv Dayal and Another (2019) 8 SCC 637, which establishes that interference with concurrent findings of fact is permissible only if they are based on a misreading of material evidence or are per se unreasonable

The Court observed that the plaintiffs’ title was corroborated by uncontroverted revenue records

In evaluating the plea of adverse possession, the Court found that the appellant failed to provide clear pleadings or evidence regarding the specific point in time when his possession became hostile to the true owner

the evidence suggested that the possession originated permissively, which precludes the claim of adverse possession

The Court emphasized that under Section 100 of the CPC, it cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view for that of the lower courts unless the findings are shown to be perverse or based on no evidence

As the lower courts’ findings were grounded in a proper appreciation of the facts, the Court determined that no substantial question of law was involved

The Court answered that no substantial question of law arose for consideration

Consequently, the Second Appeal was dismissed at the admission stage, affirming the plaintiffs' title and the order for delivery of vacant possession

No order as to costs was made