01Facts
On March 28, 2020, during the COVID-19 lockdown, the petitioner was stopped by police at a picket at Aruna Asaf Ali Marg while walking. He stated he was out because he could not pass time at home.
¶ 3An FIR was registered under Section 188 IPC for violating MHA and ACP orders.
¶ 4Later, Sections 269, 270, and 336 IPC were added in the chargesheet.
¶ 5The petitioner contended he was actually heading for a medical follow-up for back pain, supported by a medical certificate dated March 21, 2020, which the State later verified as genuine.
¶ 7, 13, 23The Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the offences on May 24, 2022, prompting the petitioner to seek quashing under Section 482 CrPC.
¶ 2, 602Issues
i.1. Whether the allegations in the FIR and investigation material, even if accepted, disclose the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 188, 269, 270, and 336 of the IPC.
¶ 16ii.2. Whether the lack of a COVID-19 test or evidence of infection prevents prosecution under Sections 269 and 270 IPC.
¶ 28-3003Law Applied
The court primarily applied Section 188 IPC (disobedience to public servant's order), which requires "knowledge" of the order and a resulting "danger to human life/safety".
¶ 17-18The court relied on Bhoop Singh Tyagi v. State, establishing that the FIR must indicate the accused had actual knowledge of the order.
¶ 19Regarding quashing powers, the court applied Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), confirming Section 482 CrPC survives the filing of a chargesheet.
¶ 15The court applied State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which allows quashing when allegations do not prima facie constitute an offence.
¶ 33For Sections 269 and 270 IPC, it applied the principle that the accused must be shown to be infected or symptomatic, citing Sidak Singh Sandhu v. U.T. Chandigarh.
¶ 29Provisions in the judgment · 2
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 161, 195, 195(1)(a)(i), 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 188, 269, 270, 336
04Reasoning
The Court found the prosecution under Section 188 IPC untenable as the specific prohibitory order was not annexed to the chargesheet, and there was no evidence of its "promulgation" or the petitioner’s "knowledge" thereof.
¶ 21Furthermore, the petitioner’s solitary presence on the road did not cause the "obstruction or danger" required by the statute, especially as movement for medical needs was an exempted category.
¶ 22-25Regarding Sections 269 and 270 IPC, the Court observed that the petitioner was never tested for COVID-19, nor was it alleged he was infected; thus, he could not have known his actions were likely to spread disease.
¶ 30Section 336 IPC was deemed inapplicable because the prosecution failed to identify any specific individual whose life or safety was endangered by the petitioner’s walk.
¶ 3105Holding
The Court answered the issues in the negative, holding that the prosecution was an abuse of process as the foundational ingredients of the alleged offences were absent.
¶ 33The Court quashed FIR No. 105/2020 and all consequential proceedings, including the trial in State v. Anupam Shahu. It held that mere presence on a public road without evidence of infection or knowledge of a specific promulgated order does not constitute the charged offences.
¶ 30, 31, 34Original Court PDF
Anupam ShahuvsThe State
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