Mere Registration of FIR Without Judicial Cognizance Cannot Justify Impounding or Denial of Passport Renewal

The Petitioner applied for the renewal of his passport in October 2024.

During verification, the authorities noted the pendency of FIR No. 603/2018.

Despite the Petitioner’s reply to a show-cause notice, the Regional Passport Officer issued an order on January 17, 2025, impounding the passport on the grounds that the Petitioner failed to disclose the FIR.

The Petitioner’s subsequent appeal was rejected on March 25, 2025.

At the time of the impounding order, no court had taken cognizance of the FIR; cognizance was only taken later, on February 7, 2025.

The Petitioner challenged both the impounding and the appellate orders before the High Court.

1. Whether the mere registration of an FIR or a pending investigation constitutes "pendency of criminal proceedings" under Sections 6(2)(f) and 10(3)(e) of the Passports Act, 1967.

2. Whether the orders to impound the Petitioner’s passport were legally sustainable given that cognizance was taken after the date of the initial impounding order.

The Court applied Section 6(2)(f) and Section 10(3)(e) of the Passports Act, 1967, which govern the refusal and impounding of passports due to pending criminal proceedings.

It relied on Clause 5(vi) of the Ministry of External Affairs’ Office Memorandum (OM) dated October 10, 2019, which clarifies that criminal proceedings are only "pending" if a court has taken cognizance of the case.

The Court further applied the constitutional principle from Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, establishing the right to travel as a facet of Article 21.

The Court further applied Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, which held that even the pendency of a case is not an absolute bar to passport renewal.

The Court reasoned that under the MEA’s own guidelines (OM dated 10.10.2019), "mere filing of FIRs and cases under investigation" do not fall within the scope of Section 6(2)(f) of the Act.

The Court observed that the impounding order was dated January 17, 2025, whereas the judicial order taking cognizance of the offences was only passed on February 7, 2025.

Consequently, at the time the decision to impound was made, no criminal proceedings were legally "pending" against the Petitioner.

The Court emphasized that any state action restricting the right to a passport must be reasonable and proportional; since the Petitioner’s situation at the time of the order did not meet the legal threshold of pending litigation, the impounding was an unjustified restriction on personal liberty.

The Court set aside the impounding order dated January 17, 2025, and the appellate order dated March 25, 2025.

The writ petition was disposed of in favor of the Petitioner.