Merely designating disputed property as a trust’s office does not constitute forgery or cheating.

Respondent Prashant Sharma alleged that the applicant, Maya Sharma, and others had fraudulently created and registered a trust deed concerning property at S-16/38, Varanasi, and had shown the property as the trust’s registered office.

After an initial final report, further investigation resulted in a charge-sheet against Maya Sharma under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC; the Magistrate took cognizance on 27 July 2017.

Maya Sharma contended that the property was disputed family property and that she had an interest in it when the trust deed was executed in August 2009, before a 2010 compromise concerning its ownership.

The complainant asserted that the applicant had no title to the property and that the trust deed impeded his possession following his purchase in 2014.

The applicant sought quashing of the charge-sheet, cognizance order and criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.

1. Whether the allegations and material on record prima facie disclosed offences under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC, warranting continuation of the prosecution.

2. Whether the trust deed’s designation of the disputed property as the trust’s registered office, in the context of the parties’ property dispute, constituted a fraudulent or forged document.

Section 482 CrPC empowers the High Court to quash criminal proceedings where the allegations do not prima facie establish an offence or continuation of the prosecution would serve no useful purpose.

Under Sections 463–464 IPC, forgery requires the making of a false document; a person who is not its maker cannot be prosecuted for forgery merely because the document concerns property to which that person may lack title (Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, (2018) 7 SCC 581).

Section 420 IPC requires deception, dishonest inducement to deliver property or undertake an act, and dishonest intention at the time of inducement; Sections 467 and 468 require forgery of the specified kind and, for Section 468, an intention that the forged document be used for cheating; Section 471 requires fraudulent or dishonest use of a document known or believed to be forged (Vishal Noble Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680; Mariam Fasihuddin v. State, (2024) 11 SCC 733).

The Court found that the trust deed identified Maya Sharma as principal trustee and stated the trust’s registered office address, but did not assert that the trustees owned the disputed property or purport to transfer its title to the trust.

Merely locating the trust’s office at the property did not establish that the deed was false or that the applicant had fraudulently divested the complainant or other owners of their rights.

The material therefore did not prima facie show the making or use of a forged document, dishonest inducement to deliver property, or the other elements of the alleged offences.

The competing claims to ownership and possession were already the subject of civil litigation, and the applicant’s asserted basis for claiming an interest was disputed; that civil dispute did not, without more, make execution of the trust deed criminal.

It quashed the charge-sheet dated 14 July 2017, the cognizance order dated 27 July 2017, and the consequential criminal proceedings in Case No. 10839 of 2017 under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.

It clarified that its observations would not influence the decision of the pending civil suit, which was to be decided on its merits and in accordance with law.