MHADA Executive Engineer Can Initiate Summary Eviction of Tenants Blocking Redevelopment, Bombay High Court Rules

The petitions concerned redevelopment of Issa Building, a cessed building in Mumbai, under Regulation 33(7) of the Development Control and Promotion Regulations, 2034.

The owners had obtained a No Objection Certificate (NOC), and approximately 57 of the building’s 83 occupants had surrendered possession and executed Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements (PAAAs).

The petitioners, a group of occupants who had not vacated, challenged proceedings under Section 95A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (MHADA Act), including eviction notices issued by the Executive Engineer.

They alleged that the owners had not complied with specified NOC conditions, including those concerning PAAAs, rehabilitation area, corpus, and a bank guarantee or deposit.

They also argued that the Executive Engineer lacked jurisdiction to act under Section 95A.

The High Court heard the petitions together and considered both challenges.

Whether the Executive Engineer was authorised under the MHADA Act and the Board’s administrative arrangements to initiate proceedings under Section 95A.

Whether alleged non-compliance with NOC conditions made the Section 95A proceedings premature or illegal.

Section 95A of the MHADA Act provides a summary mechanism for eviction in specified redevelopment situations once its jurisdictional requirements are met, including the requisite occupant consent and grant of an NOC; affected occupants must receive notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Sections 16 and 18 establish the Act’s administrative structure, including the role of Board Chief Officers, while Section 16(2) places Boards under the Authority’s superintendence, direction and control.

Section 181 concerns delegation of the Authority’s powers and does not displace the administrative structure in Sections 16 and 18.

The principle delegatus non potest delegare may yield to contrary indications in the statute’s language, scope or object.

The Court also relied on Radhika George v. MHADA, which held that Section 95A proceedings are not a forum for full adjudication of civil disputes, and distinguished Sahni Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation and Javed Abdul Rahim Attar v. MHADA on their facts and statutory context.

The Court held that the Board acts through the administrative machinery provided by Sections 16 and 18, and that the Chief Officer is an officer of the Board, not an external delegate.

The Board had directed that Section 95A actions be executed by the Executive Engineer, and the Chief Officer had specifically authorised the action in this case; those administrative orders were not challenged.

Section 181 did not apply because the case did not involve delegation of the Authority’s powers.

On the NOC challenge, the Court accepted the authorities’ evidence that the relevant obligations either had been complied with or offered, or were due at a later stage—for example, the 10% rehabilitation construction-cost deposit was due before demolition, which had not begun, and PAAAs were to be submitted before a later construction approval.

The owners’ undertaking to provide transit rent and corpus and register PAAAs on the terms offered to other tenants further addressed the asserted prejudice.

It found no jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice or other illegality warranting interference under Article 226, and held that the proceedings were initiated within the framework of Section 95A.

All writ petitions were dismissed, the Rule was discharged, and there was no order as to costs.

The Court also recorded its expectation that MHADA would ensure compliance with the NOC conditions and act in the event of a breach.