Minor sons’ Section 125 maintenance ends upon attaining majority during proceedings.

The petitioner challenged the Family Court, Khagaria’s order dated 7 March 2025 in Maintenance Case No. 38 of 2008, which directed him to pay ₹4,000 per month to opposite party no. 2 and ₹1,000 per month to each of her two sons under Section 125 CrPC.

He contended that opposite party no. 2 remained married to another man and that the sons had attained majority while the case was pending.

The Family Court had found that, although opposite party no. 2 had been married to another man and had not divorced him, she cohabited with the petitioner and had two sons with him.

The sons were stated to have been aged three and one when the maintenance application was filed in 2008.

1. Whether the Family Court’s award of maintenance to opposite party no. 2 was liable to be set aside on the ground that she remained married to another man.

2. Whether the sons’ entitlement to maintenance continued after they attained majority during the pendency of the maintenance case.

Section 125 CrPC provides the basis for maintenance claims considered in this case.

The High Court stated that revisional jurisdiction is limited: interference is warranted where the challenged order suffers from manifest illegality, infirmity, or incorrectness, and the revisional court should not merely re-appreciate facts to reach a different finding.

In assessing opposite party no. 2’s entitlement, the Family Court had relied on N. Usha Rani v. Moodudula Srinivas, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 225, and Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 SCC 188.

The High Court further held that the ages admitted in the maintenance application governed the sons’ entitlement, but that entitlement ended upon their attaining majority.

The High Court found no basis for revisional interference with the Family Court’s assessment of opposite party no. 2’s relationship with the petitioner: the Family Court had considered her prior marriage, the absence of divorce, their cohabitation, and the evidence concerning the sons.

It nevertheless accepted the petitioner’s challenge as to the duration of the sons’ maintenance.

Because their ages had been stated in the original application, the Court treated those ages as controlling and concluded that they attained majority during the proceedings; later documents showing different ages could not displace the admission.

The maintenance direction in favour of opposite party no. 2 remained undisturbed, as did the sons’ entitlement up to the date they attained majority.

The petitioner was not required to pay maintenance to the sons after they attained majority.