MP HC Upholds Bank Officer’s Reinstatement After Chairman Named In His FIR Took Part In Disciplinary Inquiry

Raj Bahaddur Khare, an Officer Grade-I and Branch Manager, lodged an FIR against the Bank’s then Chairman and other senior officers, alleging harassment and threats connected with his pending service litigation.

The police filed a closure report; his subsequent private complaint was dismissed.

The Bank issued two charge-sheets alleging, among other matters, misconduct and insubordination. A common departmental enquiry found most charges proved, and Khare was removed from service by order dated 8 December 2005. The Board of Directors dismissed his appeal.

Khare challenged those decisions, contending that the Chairman, against whom he had made allegations, was biased and had participated in the disciplinary process. The Single Judge quashed the disciplinary and appellate orders and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits.

The Bank appealed, arguing that the Chairman was the designated disciplinary authority and that the doctrine of necessity applied.

Section 15 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 authorises a bank’s Board to constitute committees of directors, other persons, or both, for purposes it decides; Sections 24 and 31 provide, respectively, for Central Government directions on matters of policy involving public interest and for removal of difficulties.

Regulation 5(1) of the Bundelkhand Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2001 designates the Chairman as appointing authority for Group-A officers.

The doctrine of necessity may permit an otherwise disqualified authority to act where no lawful alternative exists, as discussed in State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava.

However, where an alternative committee or authority can be constituted, necessity does not displace the rule against bias; the Court relied on Amar Nath Choudhari v. Braithwaite and Co. Ltd. for that principle.

It also relied on Nandkishore v. Commissioner, Jabalpur Division concerning the impropriety of an authority acting in disciplinary proceedings when it is likely to be a witness.

The Court accepted that the Chairman was the designated disciplinary authority but held that this did not, on these facts, make his participation inevitable.

The Chairman was the person against whom Khare had made allegations and was also a witness in the enquiry; the Court therefore found that he should not have acted as judge in the matter.

Although the Bank relied on necessity, Section 15 provided for a Board committee, and the Court considered that the matter could have been placed before the Board; it also noted the possibility of seeking Central Government guidance or an order under Sections 24 and 31.

It further observed that the punishment order was passed by another officer, but that officer accepted the comments and observations prepared by the Chairman, leaving the bias concern unresolved.

Finally, because the appeal had remained pending under a stay for about 14 years and Khare was likely to have crossed the age of superannuation, a fresh enquiry would serve no useful purpose.

It did not remit the matter for a fresh enquiry, given the passage of time and Khare’s likely superannuation.

The connected writ petitions were directed to be listed for adjudication on merits before the Single Bench as per roster.